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INSIDER TRADING REGULATION: THE





HE modem federal insider trading prohibition is, at least accord-
ing to Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), one of the central pillars and proudest accomplishments of
American securities law.' Unfortunately, it is also an instructive case
study in how a legal regime exhibiting path dependent features went
awry, detaching itself from both statutory and policy moorings. Of partic-
ular interest is the Supreme Court's most recent insider trading decision
United States v. O'Hagan,2 wherein the court upheld the so-called "misap-
propriation theory" of insider trading liability, but took an area in which
the law made a certain amount of policy sense, albeit at the cost of sub-
stantial doctrinal tensions, and made a hash of it.
In economics, path dependence is one of the concepts that reconciles
market failures with rational choice theory.3 The popular caricature of
neo-classical economics has something of a Social Darwinist flavor. Eco-
nomic evolution tends to favor efficient equilibria, or so the story goes,
while inefficient local equilibria tend to become extinct. Path depen-
dence, in contrast, claims that inefficient local equilibria can persist over
time. Initial conditions, which may be determined by chance or other
non-economic forces (such as political interests), direct the system down
a particular path. Subsequent deviations from that path may be pre-
cluded as too costly, even if there are more desirable or efficient alterna-
tives available.4 Where the cost of reversing the initially chosen starting
point is especially high, an inefficient equilibrium that resists correction
* Professor, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Mitu Gulati and Bill Klein for com-
ments on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 1 (1984) (condemning insider trading and prais-
ing efforts to deter it).
2. 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).
3. See generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In,
and History, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
4. See Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do
Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 329-30 (1996).
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by market forces may result .5
Some legal regimes exhibit characteristics of path dependent systems.
Such a regime is politically and historically contingent, an artifact of ini-
tial conditions and its path dependent evolution. For example, regulation
of a certain type of behavior may be arbitrarily assigned to a particular
agency. In retrospect, as the legal regime evolves, we may recognize that
the initial assignment of regulatory responsibility was unfortunate. Per-
haps the legal regime has evolved such that the issues are no longer
within the agency's technical expertise. Alternatively, the regime may
have evolved such that the issue is no longer within the agency's legal
jurisdiction. In either case, the costs of reassigning the legal regime to a
more appropriate regulatory body may be sufficiently high to justify per-
mitting the initial agency to retain jurisdiction. In order to prevent the
legal equivalent of a market failure, however, we may need to adjust the
agency's regulatory purview or overlook various doctrinal irregularities.
To be clear from the outset, I do not claim that the federal insider trad-
ing prohibition is a path dependent legal regime. I claim only that path
dependence provides a pedagogically useful metaphor, in that it focuses
our attention on those aspects of the prohibition's evolution that led it
astray. Accordingly, I am using path dependence in a more colloquial
sense than the economists embroiled in the debate over the theory's va-
lidity would regard as appropriate. I do so because it is path dependence
as the term is used colloquially-a historically contingent starting point
and a high cost associated with changing paths-that provides the herme-
neutically useful metaphor.
The SEC initially captured regulatory authority over insider trading in
the 1960s. Insider trading has been treated as a species of securities fraud
ever since. Yet, there was nothing inevitable about this initial starting
point. Early common law essentially treated insider trading as a state
corporate law problem, implicating the fiduciary duties of officers and
directors. With the benefit of hindsight we might not have chosen an
initial starting point that put us on the securities fraud path. As the pro-
hibition has evolved, the federal securities laws have become an increas-
ingly poor fit within which to confine insider trading.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Chiarella,6 in-
sider trading liability has been based on a breach of fiduciary duty. In
order for liability to arise under the traditional disclose or abstain stan-
dard, the inside trader must have breached a duty owed to the person
5. The claim for path dependence is that a minor or fleeting advantage or a
seemingly inconsequential lead for some technology, product, or standard
can have important and irreversible influences on the ultimate market alloca-
tion of resources, even in a world characterized by voluntary decisions and
individually maximizing behavior .... [Path dependence thus] means that
marginal adjustments of individual agents may not offer the assurance of op-
timization or the revision of suboptimal outcomes.
Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 3, at 205-06.
6. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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with whom he/she traded.7 Under the misappropriation theory, it suffices
that the inside trader breached a duty owed to the source of the informa-
tion.8 O'Hagan, a partner in the law firm representing the prospective
bidder in a pending takeover, owed no duties to the persons with whom
he traded, but did owe duties of loyalty and confidentiality to his client.9
Hence, O'Hagan could be held liable, if at all, only under the misappro-
priation theory.
The pre-O'Hagan misappropriation theory made substantial economic
sense. The insider trading prohibition ought to be viewed as a means of
protecting property rights in information, rather than as a means of
preventing securities fraud. Viewed from that perspective, the pre-
O'Hagan misappropriation theory correctly imposed liability on those
who converted information that belonged to another for their own per-
sonal profit. Unfortunately, the SEC's regulatory jurisdiction over in-
sider trading meant that the problem was treated as a species of securities
fraud rather than one of property rights. As a result, the insider trading
prohibition inherently suffered from a number of significant tensions at
both the doctrinal and policy levels.
Nevertheless, we have come an awfully long way down this particular
path. Reversing course by divesting the SEC of regulatory jurisdiction
over insider trading, as some have proposed, would be quite costly. Not
only is there now a well-developed body of insider trading regulation
under the federal securities laws, but the SEC also has a demonstrable
comparative advantage in detecting and prosecuting insider trading.
More subtle costs relating to issues of statutory interpretation and feder-
alism will become apparent as we delve deeper into the problem. Upon
close evaluation, the path dependence metaphor counsels tinkering with
the prohibition, but not sweeping change.
Part II of this Article outlines the path dependence metaphor as I in-
tend to apply it here. Part III then uses the metaphor as a vehicle for
exploring the evolution of the insider trading prohibition from its origins
in the equal access test announced in the Second Circuit's seminal Texas
Gulf Sulphur o decision, to the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella and
Dirks,11 through the subsequent lower court decisions that created the
misappropriation theory.
Part IV turns to a critique of the Supreme Court's recent O'Hagan
decision. As we shall see, the Court ducked, misunderstood, or mishan-
dled virtually every issue presented by that case. O'Hagan nevertheless
rewards careful analysis in several respects. First, O'Hagan sheds light on
the proper understanding and interpretation of Supreme Court decision-
making in highly technical statutory cases. Specifically, I propose that
7. See id. at 226-30.
8. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
9. See id. at 653.
10. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. Denied 394 U.S. 976
(1968).
11. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Supreme Court decisionmaking in such areas is compromised by bounded
rationality and, accordingly, by a tendency to give undue deference to
specialists. Although further research will be necessary to fully develop
this thesis, the present account is highly suggestive. In particular, it ex-
plains the otherwise puzzling acquiescence of courts in the SEC's pro-
gram of expanding the insider trading prohibition. Second, O'Hagan has
important, albeit uncertain, implications for Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. In
particular, precedents touching on federalism and statutory interpretation
in this context have been left suspect, if not actually rendered nugatory.
Finally, O'Hagan has some surprising implications for the role property
and contracts play in determining the scope of securities fraud claims. It
is widely assumed that the federal securities laws are mandatory, not en-
abling.12 Parties presumably cannot opt out of those rules by contract or
otherwise. Yet, the logic of O'Hagan implicitly validates opting out of the
securities laws or, at least, of Rule 10b-5. Part IV concludes by returning
to the core intuition of this Article, that insider trading ought to be re-
garded as a property rights problem rather than a securities fraud issue,
but that the prohibition's path dependent evolution suggests the need for
doctrinal compromise in order to resolve the resulting tensions. Unfortu-
nately, the O'Hagan majority muffed the opportunity to craft just such a
compromise.
II. METAPHOR
I do not intend to claim that the federal insider trading prohibition
meets the economic criteria of a path dependent system. Nor do I intend
to take a position on the debatable question of whether path dependency
is an economically significant phenomenon in the real world,13 and, if so,
whether a theory that may explain the persistence of suboptimal products
translates into a theory that demonstrates the existence and persistence
of suboptimal legal rules.14 My claim is only that in this particular con-
text, path dependency is a pedagogically useful metaphor.
Mark Roe offers a nice parable, which neatly captures the core intui-
tion of the metaphor as I propose to use it:
We are on a road and wonder why it winds and goes here instead of
there, when a straight road would be a much easier drive. Today's
road depends on what path was taken before. Decades ago, a fur
trader cut a path through the woods, and the trader, bent on avoid-
ing a wolves' den and other dangerous sites, took a winding indirect
route. Were the fur trader a better hunter of wolves, the trader
12. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 91
(1993).
13. Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 3, persuasively demonstrate that stable ineffi-
cient equilibria ascribable to path dependence are both theoretically improbable and em-
pirically rare.
14. For an excellent discussion of this issue, which also provides a useful overview of
the legal literature on the path dependence phenomenon, see Frederick W. Lambert, Path
Dependent Inefficiency in the Corporate Contract: The Uncertain Case with Less Certain
Implications, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1077 (1998).
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might have chosen a straighter path. Later travelers dragged wagons
along the same winding path the trader chose, deepening the grooves
and clearing away some trees. Travelers continued to deepen and
broaden the road even after the dangerous sites were gone. Industry
came and settled in the road's bends; housing developments went up
that fit the road and industry. Local civic promoters widened the
path and paved it into a road suitable for today's trucks. It is time to
resurface the road. Should today's authorities straighten it out at the
same time?15
In this road parable, as I shall refer to it hereinafter, the highway's
course was determined by a historically contingent set of initial starting
conditions: namely, the trader's need to avoid danger. Small changes in
that initial set of conditions might have led to an outcome that would be
more desirable today; namely, a straight road. Because the costs of
straightening the road appear excessive, however, we are now stuck in a
local equilibrium that preserves the winding road.
Roe implies that the winding road is (or, at least, may be) inefficient,16
but I am not so sure. The road parable, as he set it up, is an example of
what economists Stan Leibowitz and Stephen Margolis call "second-de-
gree path dependence. 1 7 This form of path dependence involves so-
called regrettable choices. Decisions made with imperfect ex ante knowl-
edge may result in an outcome that ex post is undesirable but also would
be costly to change. If the ultimate inferiority of the decision could not
have been known at the initial starting point and the costs of changing
paths exceed the benefits of such a change the resulting local equilibrium
technically is not inefficient.
A local equilibrium is inefficient in the Pareto superiority sense if it is
possible to make at least one person better off without making anyone
worse off. In terms of Roe's parable, a winding road is inefficient in this
sense only if someone will gain from straightening the road and no one
will be injured. As Roe has set up the problem, however, it is clear that
some persons, such as the owners of the factories along the roadside, will
incur significant costs if the road's course is changed. Even if we switch
gears to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the winding road still may not be ineffi-
cient. A change in position is Kaldor-Hicks efficient even if some persons
are worse off, so long as the gains to those who are better off are suffi-
cient to compensate the losers. To say that the winding road is inefficient
in the Kaldor-Hicks sense is to assert that the benefits of straightening
the road exceed the costs of doing so, including the costs incurred by
those persons who have adapted to the road's current course. It is not at
all clear that the winding road, as Roe has set up the problem, is ineffi-
cient in this sense. It could well be that the gains to those who are better
off with a straight road are insufficient to compensate those who will lose
15. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 643 (1996).
16. See id. at 644.
17. Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 3, at 207.
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in the straightening process.' 8
The distinction between the second-degree path dependence exhibited
by the road parable and true (or third-degree) path dependence is driven
by the availability of a feasible alternative to the suboptimal equilibrium.
Only if such an alternative is available does the phenomenon in question
demonstrate true path dependence. Only if such an alternative neverthe-
less remains untaken can the phenomenon in question even potentially
be deemed inefficient in either the Pareto superior or Kaldor-Hicks
sense.
III. EVOLUTION
As applied to the insider trading problem, the path dependence meta-
phor focuses our attention on what I believe to be the critical issues: Was
the choice of securities fraud as the vehicle for regulating insider trading
historically contingent or was it mandated by efficiency considerations?
As the prohibition evolved, did that choice prove regrettable? If so, is
the current equilibrium an inefficient one? What are the costs and bene-
fits of straightening the path we have been following for the last thirty-
plus years?
A. THE SECURITIES FRAUD PATH
The modern federal insider trading prohibition fairly can be said to
have begun with the SEC's enforcement action In re Cady, Roberts &
Co.19 Curtiss-Wright Corporation's board of directors decided to reduce
the company's quarterly dividend. One of the directors, J. Cheever Cow-
din, was also a partner of Cady, Roberts & Co., a stock brokerage firm.
Before the news was announced, Cowdin informed one of his partners,
Robert M. Gintel, of the impending dividend cut. Gintel then sold sev-
eral thousand shares of Curtiss-Wright stock held in customer accounts
over which he had discretionary trading authority. When the dividend
cut was announced, Curtiss-Wright's stock price fell several dollars per
share. Gintel's customers thus avoided substantial losses.
Cady, Roberts involved what is now known as "tipping:" an insider who
knows confidential information does not himself trade, but rather in-
forms, tips, someone else, who does trade. It also involved trading on an
impersonal stock exchange, instead of a face-to-face transaction. As the
18. Admittedly, I am assuming away other forms of market failure, such as free-riding,
collective action problems, and interest group interference in the political process. As Roe
correctly points out, in the presence of one or more such market failures, an inefficient
local equilibrium might be preserved despite the evolutionary workings of market forces.
See Roe, supra note 15, at 651 (Roe calls this "strong-form path dependence"). In such a
case, however, it is incorrect to blame the resulting inefficiency on either the initially cho-
sen starting point or the path dependent nature of its evolution. Instead, any present inef-
ficiency is correctly blamed on the specific market failure that prevents us from making a
Kaldor-Hicks efficient change. Roe acknowledges the point. See id. at 652 n.21.
19. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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SEC acknowledged, this made it "a case of first impression. '20 Although
Rule 10b-5 had sometimes been invoked prior to Cady, Roberts to deal
with insider trading-like issues, those cases typically involved issues of
tortious fraudulent concealment in face-to-face or control transactions. 21
Notwithstanding, the SEC held that Gintel had violated Rule 10b-5. In
so doing, it articulated what became known as the "disclose or abstain"
rule: An insider in possession of material nonpublic information must dis-
close such information before trading or, if disclosure is impossible or
improper, abstain from trading.22
It was not immediately clear what precedential value Cady, Roberts
would have.23 It was an administrative ruling by the SEC, not a judicial
opinion. It involved a regulated industry, closely supervised by the SEC.
Neither the text of the statute nor its legislative history supported, let
alone mandated, a broad insider trading prohibition. 24 There was a long
line of state law precedent to the contrary. 25 In short order, however,
Cady, Roberts became the law of the land.
If Cady, Roberts was a regulatory power-grab by the SEC, the Second
Circuit vindicated and validated the Commission's action in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. 26 In March 1959, agents of Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
(Texas Gulf Sulphur), a mining corporation, began aerial surveys of an
area near Timmins, Ontario. They found evidence of an ore deposit. In
October 1963, Texas Gulf Sulphur began ground surveys of the area. In
early November, a drilling rig took core samples from depths of several
hundred feet. Visual examination of the samples suggested commercially
significant deposits of copper and zinc. Texas Gulf Sulphur's president
ordered the exploration group to maintain strict confidentiality, even to
the point of withholding the news from other Texas Gulf Sulphur direc-
20. Id. at 907.
21. The handful of Rule 10b-5 decisions cited as precedent by Cady, Roberts uniformly
involved face-to-face transactions and/or control transactions. See, e.g., Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (omissions in connection with what
amounted to a tender offer); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(sale of control negotiated face to face); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373
(1943) (same). As such, they do not support extension of Rule 10b-5 or Section 10(b) to
modern insider trading violations on impersonal stock exchanges. Interestingly, in a post-
Cady, Roberts case (but pre-Texas Gulf Sulphur), arising under Rule 10b-5, the Seventh
Circuit applied the old state law special circumstances rule to a face-to-face transaction,
which confirms that there was no general bar on insider trading prior to Texas Gulf
Sulphur. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963).
22. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
23. See, e.g., Recent Decisions, 48 VA. L. REV. 398, 403-04 (1962) ("[I]n view of the
limited resources of the Commission, the unfortunate existence of more positive and repre-
hensible forms of fraud, and the inherent problems concerning proof and evidence adher-
ing to any controversy involving a breach of duty of disclosure, there is little prospect of
excessive litigation evolving pursuant to [Cady, Roberts]").
24. Although the claim is somewhat controversial, I have argued elsewhere that Con-
gress in 1934 did not intend for Section 10(b) to prohibit insider trading as we know it
today. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Fed-
eral Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1189, 1228-34 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Bainbridge, State Law].
25. See id. at 1218-27 (analyzing cases).
26. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 833.
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tors and employees. In early December, a chemical assay confirmed the
presence of copper, zinc, and silver. At the subsequent trial, several ex-
pert witnesses testified that they had never heard of any other initial ex-
ploratory drill hole showing comparable results. Over the next several
months, Texas Gulf Sulphur acquired the rights to the land under which
this remarkable ore deposit lay. In March and early April 1964, further
drilling confirmed that Texas Gulf Sulphur had made a significant ore
discovery. After denying several rumors about the find, Texas Gulf
Sulphur finally announced its discovery in a press conference on April 16,
1964.
Throughout the fall of 1963 and spring of 1964, a number of Texas Gulf
Sulphur insiders bought stock and/or options on company stock. Others
tipped off outsiders, while others accepted stock options from the com-
pany's board of directors without informing the directors of the discov-
ery. Between November 1963 and March 1964, the insiders were able to
buy at prices that were slowly rising, albeit with fluctuations, from just
under $18 per share to $25 per share. As rumors began circulating in late
March and early April, the price jumped to about $30 per share. On
April 16th, the stock opened at $31, but quickly jumped to $37 per share.
By May 15, 1964, Texas Gulf Sulphur's stock was trading at over $58 per
share-a 222% rise over the previous November's price.27 Any joy the
insiders may have taken from their profits was short-lived, however, as
the SEC sued them for violating Rule 10b-5.
In what quickly became a leading opinion, the Second Circuit agreed
with the SEC that rule 10b-5 had been violated. The court held that when
an insider has material nonpublic information the insider must either dis-
close such information before trading or abstain from trading until the
information has been disclosed.2 8 Thus, was born what is now known as
the "disclose or abstain" rule.
Texas Gulf Sulphur thus started the insider trading prohibition down a
path upon which insider trading was deemed a form of securities fraud
and, accordingly, within the SEC's regulatory jurisdiction. There was
nothing inevitable about that choice, however. State corporate law had
been regulating insider trading for decades before Texas Gulf Sulphur
was decided. Well-established state precedents treated the problem as
one implicating not concepts of deceit or manipulation, but rather the
fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors.29 To be sure, many
states held that insider trading did not violate those duties, especially with
respect to stock market transactions, but so what? In light of those prece-
dents, the Second Circuit could have held that insider trading was not
within Rule 10b-5's regulatory purview. If it had done so, the prohibition
27. See id. at 843-47.
28. See id. at 848.




would have evolved along a far different path than the one it actually
followed.
Although the starting point chosen for the prohibition's evolutionary
path was historically contingent, it was likely far from accidental? 0 The
SEC had strong incentives to capture jurisdiction over insider trading.31
The Commission presumably desired to enlarge its jurisdiction and en-
hance its prestige. According to a widely accepted theory of bureaucratic
behavior, administrators can maximize their salaries, power, and reputa-
tion by maximizing the size of their agency's budget.32 A vigorous en-
forcement program directed at a highly visible and unpopular law
violation surely was an effective means of attracting political support for
larger budgets. Given the media attention directed towards insider trad-
ing prosecutions, and the public taste for prohibiting insider trading, it
provided a very attractive subject for such a program.
During the prohibition's formative years, there was a major effort to
federalize corporate law. In order to maintain its budgetary priority over
competing agencies, the SEC wanted to play a major role in federalizing
matters previously within the state domain. Insider trading was an ideal
target for federalization. Rapid expansion of the federal insider trading
prohibition purportedly demonstrated the superiority of federal securities
law over state corporate law. Because the states had shown little interest
in insider trading for years, federal regulation demonstrated the moder-
nity, flexibility, and innovativeness of the securities laws. The SEC's
prominent role in attacking insider trading thus placed it in the vanguard
of the movement to federalize corporate law and ensured that the Com-
mission would have a leading role in any system of federal corporations
law.
B. THE ROAD CURVES
The policy foundation on which the Second Circuit erected the disclose
or abstain rule was equality of access to information. The court con-
cluded (on the basis of two law review articles) that the federal insider
trading prohibition was intended to assure that "all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material informa-
tion."'33 Put another way, Congress purportedly intended "that all mem-
30. One of several reasons I find the road parable pedagogically useful in this context
is that it immediately suggests the relevance of public choice analysis. Anyone even
vaguely aware of how transportation policy gets made will recognize that the parable im-
plies the need for and utility of an interest group-based mode of analysis.
31. I have elsewhere offered a more elaborate account of the SEC's incentives to cap-
ture and maintain its control of regulatory jurisdiction over insider trading, from which the
following summary is drawn. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1246-49. My
account there drew, inter alia, on Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Re-
strictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 59-62 (1980) [hereinafter Dooley, Enforcement of Insider
Trading].
32. See GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUB-
LIC LAW 85 (1991).
33. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
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bers of the investing public should be subject to identical market
risks. .... "34
The equality of access principle admittedly has some intuitive appeal.
As we shall see, the SEC consistently has tried to maintain it as the basis
of insider trading liability. Many commentators still endorse it, typically
on fairness grounds.35 The implications of the equal access principle be-
come troubling when we start dealing with attenuated circumstances; es-
pecially with respect to market information. For example, suppose a
Texas Gulf Sulphur representative had approached a landowner in the
Timmins area to negotiate purchasing mineral rights to the land. Texas
Gulf Sulphur's agent did not disclose the ore strike, but the landowner
turns out to be pretty smart. She knows Texas Gulf Sulphur has been
drilling in the area and has heard rumors that it has been buying up a lot
of mineral rights. She puts two and two together, reaches the obvious
conclusion, and buys some Texas Gulf Sulphur stock. Under a literal
reading of Texas Gulf Sulphur, is our landowner liable for illegal insider
trading?
The surprising answer is "probably." The Texas Gulf Sulphur court
stated that the insider trading prohibition applies to "anyone in posses-
sion of material inside information," because Section 10(b) was intended
to assure that "all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have rela-
tively equal access to material information. ' 36 The court further stated
that the prohibition applies to anyone who has "access, directly or indi-
rectly" to confidential information if she knows that the information is
unavailable to the investing public.37 The only issue thus may be a factual
one, turning on the landowner's state of mind: whether she knew that she
was dealing with confidential information. If so, the equal access policy
would seem to justify imposing a duty on her. Query, however, whether
the insider trading prohibition should stretch quite that far?
In Chiarella v. United States,38 the Supreme Court concluded that it
should not. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the method by which it con-
strained the insider trading prohibition proved an infelicitous choice.
Vincent Chiarella was an employee of Pandick Press, a financial printer
that prepared tender offer disclosure materials, among other documents.
In preparing those materials, Pandick used codes to conceal the names of
the companies involved, but Chiarella broke the codes. He purchased
target company shares before the bid was announced, then sold the
shares for considerable profits after announcement of the bid. He got
34. Id. at 852.
35. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Words From on High About Rule 1Ob-5:
Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 883 (1995) (expressing
a preference for an insider trading prohibition grounded on a duty to disclose to the
market).
36. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
37. Id (emphasis added).
38. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
1598 [Vol. 52
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
caught and was indicted for illegal insider trading.39
Chiarella was convicted of violating Rule 10b-5 by trading on the basis
of material nonpublic information. The Second Circuit affirmed his con-
viction, applying the same equality of access to information-based dis-
close or abstain rule it had created in Texas Gulf Sulphur.40 Under the
equal access-based standard, Chiarella clearly loses: he had greater access
to information than those with whom he traded.
The Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the Court squarely rejected
the notion that Section 10(b) was intended to assure all investors equal
access to information. The Court said it could not affirm Chiarella's con-
viction without recognizing a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forego trades based on material, nonpublic infor-
mation, and it refused to impose such a duty.41
Thus, Chiarella made clear that the disclose or abstain rule is not trig-
gered merely because the trader possesses material nonpublic informa-
tion. When a Rule 10b-5 action is based upon nondisclosure, there can be
no fraud absent a duty to speak, and no such duty arises from the mere
possession of nonpublic information. 42 Instead, the disclose or abstain
theory of liability for insider trading is premised on the inside trader be-
ing subject to a duty to disclose to the party on the other side of the
transaction that arose from a relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween the parties.4 3 As applied to the facts at bar, Chiarella was not an
employee, officer, or director of any of the companies in whose stock he
traded. He worked solely for Pandick Press, which was not an agent of
any of those companies. Pandick worked primarily for acquiring compa-
nies-not the takeover targets in whose stock Chiarella traded. There-
fore he had no duty to disclose to those with whom he traded.44
Chiarella radically limited the scope of the insider trading prohibition
as it had been defined in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Just three years later, how-
ever, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and refined its new approach to in-
sider trading in Dirks v. SEC.45 Raymond Dirks was a securities analyst
who uncovered the massive Equity Funding of America fraud. Dirks first
began investigating Equity Funding after receiving allegations from Ron-
ald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding, that the corporation was
engaged in widespread fraudulent corporate practices. Dirks passed the
results of his investigation to the SEC and the Wall Street Journal, but also
discussed his findings with various clients. A number of those clients sold
their holdings of Equity Funding securities before any public disclosure
of the fraud, thereby avoiding substantial losses. After the fraud was
made public and Equity Funding went into receivership, the SEC began
39. See id. at 224-25.
40. See id. at 232.
41. See id. at 233.
42. See id. at 235.
43. See id. at 230.
44. See id. at 232-33.
45. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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an investigation of Dirks's role in exposing the fraud, concluding that
Dirks violated the federal insider trading prohibition by repeating the al-
legations of fraud to his clients. 46
Under the Texas Gulf Sulphur equal access to information standard,
tipping of the sort at issue in Dirks presented no conceptual problems.
The tippee had access to information unavailable to those with whom he
traded and, as such, was liable. After Chiarella, however, the tipping
problem was more complex. Neither Dirks nor his customers were
agents, officers, or directors of Equity Funding. Nor did they have any
other form of special relationship of trust and confidence with those with
whom they traded. They were complete strangers.
In reversing Dirks's censure, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejec-
tion of the equal access standard:
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to
disclose where the person who has traded on inside information "was
not [the corporation's] agent,.. . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a
person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust
and confidence." Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, we
recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established doctrine
that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties" and
would amount to "recognizing a general duty between all partici-
pants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, non-
public information." 47
Recognizing that the Chiarella formulation posed problems for tipping
cases, the court held that tipping could violate the insider trading prohibi-
tion, but further held that a tippee's liability is derivative of the tipper's,
"arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach
of a fiduciary duty."' 48 A tippee, therefore, is held liable only when the
tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by disclosing information to the tippee,
and the tippee knows or has reason to know of the breach of duty.49
On the Dirks facts, this formulation precluded imposition of liability.
To be sure, Secrist was an officer and, hence, a fiduciary of Equity Fund-
ing. But the mere fact that an insider tips nonpublic information is not
enough under Dirks. What Dirks proscribes is not merely a breach of
confidentiality by the insider, but rather a breach of the duty of loyalty
imposed on all fiduciaries to avoid personally profiting from information
entrusted to them. 50 Looking at objective criteria, courts must determine
whether the insider personally benefited, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure.5 1 Secrist tipped off Dirks in order to bring Equity Funding's
misconduct to light, not for any personal gain. Absent the requisite per-
46. See id. at 648-52.
47. Id. at 654-55 (citations omitted) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33).
48. Id. at 659 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12).
49. See id. at 660.




sonal benefit, liability could not be imposed.52
Just as there had been nothing historically or economically inevitable
about Texas Gulf Sulphur's imposition of the equal access standard, there
was equally nothing inevitable about the Supreme Court's rejection of
that standard. The equal access standard was consistent with a trend to-
wards affirmative disclosure obligations and away from caveat emptor
that was sweeping a broad swath across the common law.53 In rejecting
this trend, Justice Powell arguably shifted the focus of insider trading lia-
bility from deceit to agency, a point that becomes especially significant
later in our analysis.54 Nothing in the text of the statute or the rule ex-
plicitly mandated this shift, nor was it required by the relevant prece-
dents. To the contrary, Justice Powell's use of precedent in Chiarella and
Dirks was highly suspect.5 5 In Dirks, for example, he opined:
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the SEC recog-
nized that the common law in some jurisdictions imposes on "corpo-
rate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
shareholders" an "affirmative duty of disclosure.., when dealing in
securities." The SEC found that.., breach of this common-law duty
also establish[ed] the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation .... 56
Although Powell acknowledged that the common law duty upon which
Cady, Roberts purportedly rested existed only in "some jurisdictions," he
failed to acknowledge that that duty was essentially limited to face-to-
face transactions between the issuer's officers or directors and the issuer's
current shareholders. With no analysis or citation of authority, moreover,
Powell extrapolated from this limited, state common law duty the all-en-
compassing federal rule that all "insiders [are] forbidden by their fiduci-
ary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information
to their advantage ....
C. THE ROAD CURVES BACK
In response to the set-backs it suffered in Chiarella and Dirks, the SEC
began advocating a new theory of insider trading liability: the misappro-
priation theory. The theory's origins are commonly (but incorrectly)
traced to Chief Justice Burger's Chiarella dissent. Burger contended that
the way in which the inside trader acquires the nonpublic information on
which he trades could itself be a material circumstance that must be dis-
closed to the market before trading. Accordingly, he argued, "a person
who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty [to
the persons with whom he trades] to disclose that information or to re-
52. See id. at 666-67.
53. See Langevoort, supra note 35, at 870-71.
54. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's
Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 15 (1998).
55. See Langevoort, supra note 35, at 872; Pritchard, supra note 54, at 22-29.
56. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 911 n.13 (1961)).
57. Id. at 659.
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frain from trading. s58 The majority did not address the merits of this
theory; instead the majority rejected the theory solely on the ground that
it had not been presented to the jury, and thus could not sustain a crimi-
nal conviction. 59
Thus, the way was left open for the SEC to urge, and the lower courts
to adopt, the misappropriation theory as an alternative basis of insider
trading liability. The Second Circuit swiftly moved to take advantage of
that opportunity. In United States v. Newman,60 employees of an invest-
ment bank misappropriated confidential information concerning pro-
posed mergers involving clients of the firm. As was true of Vincent
Chiarella, the Newman defendants' employer worked for prospective ac-
quiring companies, while the trading took place in target company securi-
ties. As such, the Newman defendants owed no fiduciary duties to the
investors with whom they traded. Moreover, neither the investment bank
nor its clients traded in the target companies' shares contemporaneously
with the defendants.
Unlike Chief Justice Burger's Chiarella dissent, the Second Circuit did
not assert that the Newman defendants owed any duty of disclosure to
the investors with whom they traded or had defrauded. Instead, the court
held that by misappropriating confidential information for personal gain,
the defendants had defrauded their employer and its clients, and this
fraud sufficed to impose insider trading liability on the defendants with
whom they traded.61 As eventually refined, the (pre-O'Hagan) misap-
propriation theory thus imposed liability on anyone who: (1) misappro-
priated material nonpublic information; (2) thereby breaching a fiduciary
duty or a duty arising out of a similar relationship of trust and confidence;
and (3) used that information in a securities transaction, regardless of
whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the company in whose
stock he traded.62
Like the traditional disclose or abstain rule, the pre-O'Hagan misap-
propriation theory thus required a breach of fiduciary duty before trading
on inside information became unlawful.63 The fiduciary relationship in
question, however, was a quite different one. Under the misappropria-
tion theory, the defendant did not need to owe a fiduciary duty to the
investor with whom he traded, nor did he need to owe a fiduciary duty to
the issuer of the securities that were traded. Instead, the misappropria-
tion theory applied when the inside trader violated a fiduciary duty owed
58. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
59. See id. at 236.
60. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds by Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450
(2d Cir. 1988).
61. See id. at 17.
62. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 945 (4th Cir. 1995).
63. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (stating that it is not
unlawful to trade on the basis of inadvertently overheard information).
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to the source of the information. 64 Had the misappropriation theory
been available against Chiarella, for example, his conviction could have
been upheld even though he owed no duties to those with whom he had
traded. Instead, the breach of the duty he owed to Pandick Press would
have sufficed.
The misappropriation theory should be seen as the vehicle by which the
SEC sought to recapture as much as possible the ground it had lost in
Chiarella and Dirks. In the years before O'Hagan, the SEC (and the
lower courts) seemed to view the fiduciary duty element as a mere incon-
venience that should not stand in the way of expansive insider trading
liability. They consistently sought to evade the spirit of the fiduciary duty
requirement, while complying with its letter. Even a former SEC Com-
missioner admitted as much, acknowledging that the misappropriation
theory was "merely a pretext for enforcing equal opportunity in informa-
tion."' 65 In terms of the road parable, the SEC used the misappropriation
theory as a means of curving the prohibition back towards the direction
in which Texas Gulf Sulphur had initially set it.
As with other significant turns in the prohibition's evolutionary path,
the SEC's support for the misappropriation theory was likely not acciden-
tal.66 During the 1980s, the Commission embarked upon a limited pro-
gram of deregulating the securities markets. Among other things, it
adopted a safe harbor for projections and other soft data, the shelf regis-
tration rule, and the integrated disclosure system, as well as expanded the
exemptions from registration under the Securities Act. The deregulatory
trend motivated one long-time critic of the SEC to compliment the Com-
mission for being "well on the road toward a sensible disclosure system
with much of the dead wood, idiosyncrasies, overregulation, and over-
drafting eliminated. '67 At about the same time, however, the SEC
adopted a vigorous enforcement campaign against insider trading. Not
only did the number of cases increase substantially, but also the Commis-
sion adopted a "big bang" approach under which it focused on high visi-
bility cases that would produce substantial publicity. In part, this may
have been due to an increase in the frequency of insider trading, but one
suspects the Commission's renewed interest in insider trading was moti-
vated in large measure by a desire to preserve its budget during an era of
deregulation and spending restraint. By virtue of the misappropriation
64. See e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1986), (apply-
ing misappropriation theory to a journalist who breaches his duty of confidentiality to his
employer).
65. Charles C. Cox & Keven S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 353, 366 (1988).
66. Again, I have offered a more elaborate version of this argument elsewhere, upon
which the following discussion draws. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1246-51.
The argument there is built, inter alia, on MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF COR-
PORATE LAW 816-57 (1995); JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLI-
TICS, AND POLICY (1991).
67. Homer Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the Dead Wood Out of Its Disclosure Sys-
tem?, 39 Bus. LAW. 833, 833 (1983).
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theory, the Commission restored much of the prohibition's pre-Chiarella
breadth, and thereby ensured that its budget-justifying enforcement pro-
gram would continue unimpeded.
Moreover, this point in its evolution, the insider trading prohibition
had come to benefit important interest groups. Again, the road parable
provides a useful analogy. In its early years, a proposal to straighten the
road would perhaps have faced little opposition. Today, however, build-
ings have sprung up along its present course. The road could not be
straightened without tearing down some buildings, and perhaps leaving
other landowners without an ingress and egress. Local interests with set-
tled expectations thus might strenuously oppose any major redirection of
the road.
Just so with the insider trading prohibition. The post-Chiarella insider
trading rules have been supported and driven in large part by market
professionals, a cohesive and politically powerful interest group, which
the post-Chiarella regime effectively insulates from insider trading liabil-
ity. Only insiders and quasi-insiders, such as lawyers and investment
bankers, have a greater degree of access to nonpublic information that
might affect a firm's stock price than market professionals. By basing
insider trading liability on breach of fiduciary duty, and positing that the
requisite fiduciary duty exists with respect to insiders and quasi-insiders
but not with respect to market professionals, the prohibition protects the
latter's ability to profit from new information about a firm.
D. REGRETTABLE CHOICES
In the road parable, path dependence has economic significance only if
today's authorities have reason to regret the choices their predecessors
made. Likewise, as we ponder the insider trading prohibition's S-curve,
should policymakers regret its evolutionary path? In my judgment, the
securities fraud path was a problematic choice.
Securities fraud traditionally has been concerned with protection of in-
vestors and preservation of investor confidence in the integrity of the se-
curities markets. 68 Whether insider trading implicates those policies is
highly controverted. My own view, which I have set forth in detail else-
where, is that, as a general matter, insider trading neither harms investors
nor undermines their confidence in the markets.69 Assuming arguendo
the relevance of those policies to insider trading, however, the prohibi-
tion's present shape seems anomalous.
Under current law, investors' rights vary widely depending on the iden-
tity of the trader, the nature of the inside information, and the source of
that information. Consider United States v. Carpenter.70 R. Foster Wi-
68. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1994) (stating
that the SEC argues "the broad congressional purposes behind the [securities laws are] to
protect investors from false and misleading practices that might injure them ... .
69. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1238-43.
70. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
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nans wrote the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column, a
daily report on various stocks that is said to affect the price of the stocks
discussed. Journal policy expressly treated the column's contents prior to
publication as confidential information belonging to the newspaper. De-
spite that rule, Winans agreed to provide several co-conspirators with
prepublication information as to the timing and contents of future col-
umns. His fellow conspirators then traded in those stocks based on the
expected impact of the column on the stocks' prices, sharing the profits.
Any duties Winans owed in this situation ran to an entity that had
neither issued the securities in question nor even participated in stock
market transactions. It is not immediately apparent what Winans's
breach of his duties to the Wall Street Journal has to do with the federal
securities laws. The incongruity of the misappropriation theory becomes
even more apparent when one considers that its logic suggests that the
Wall Street Journal could lawfully trade on the same information used by
Winans. If we are really concerned with protecting investors and main-
taining their confidence in the market's integrity, the inside trader's iden-
tity ought to be irrelevant. As Texas Gulf Sulphur recognized, from the
investor's point of view, insider trading is a matter of concern because
they have traded with someone with superior access to information.
From the investor's perspective, it does not matter whether it is Winans
or the Journal on the opposite side of the transaction. Both have greater
access to the relevant information than do investors.
The logic of the misappropriation theory also suggests that Winans
would not have been liable if the Wall Street Journal had authorized his
trades. In that instance, his trades would not have constituted an im-
proper conversion of nonpublic information, and the essential breach of
fiduciary duty would not be present. Again, however, from an investor's
perspective, it would not seem to matter whether Winans's trades were
authorized or not.
Finally, conduct that is lawful under the misappropriation theory is
clearly proscribed by Rule 14e-3. 71 For example, a takeover bidder may
not authorize others to trade on information about a pending tender offer
even though such trading might aid the bidder by putting stock in friendly
hands. If the acquisition is to take place by means other than a tender
offer, however, Rule 14e-3 will not apply, and neither should the misap-
propriation theory. From an investor's perspective, however, the form of
the acquisition seems just as irrelevant as the identity of the insider
trader.
In sum, if investor protection or confidence in the market were the real
issues, one would be hard-pressed to defend the pre-O'Hagan state of the
law. An expansive version of the old equal access test seems far better
suited to advancing those values, but it (supposedly) expired in Chiarella.
Something else must be going on.
71. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(c) (1998).
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There is a growing consensus that the federal insider trading prohibi-
tion is more easily justified as a means of protecting property rights in
information than as a way of protecting investors.72 As I have elsewhere
defended in some detail, a property rights-based approach to insider trad-
ing regulation, 73 a brief recapitulation will suffice here. Consider the pro-
totypical insider trading transaction, in which an insider trades in her
employer's stock on the basis of information learned solely because of
her position with the firm. The property right must be assigned to either
the corporation or the inside trader. A rule allowing insider trading as-
signs the property right to the insider, while a rule prohibiting insider
trading assigns it to the corporation.
The rationale for assigning the property right to the firm is precisely
the same as the rationale for prohibiting patent infringement or theft of
trade secrets: protecting the economic incentive to produce socially valu-
able information. As the theory goes, the readily appropriable nature of
information makes it difficult for the developer of a new idea to recoup
the sunk costs incurred in developing it.74 For example, if an inventor
develops a better mousetrap, he cannot profit on that invention without
selling mousetraps and thereby making the new design available to po-
tential competitors. Assuming both the inventor and his competitors in-
cur roughly equivalent marginal costs to produce and market the trap, the
competitors will be able to set a market price at which the inventor will
likely be unable to earn a return on his sunk costs. Ex post, the rational
inventor should ignore his sunk costs and go on producing the improved
mousetrap. Ex ante, however, the inventor will anticipate that he will be
unable to generate positive returns on his up-front costs, and therefore
will be deterred from developing socially valuable information. As Judge
Ralph Winter explained in his separate opinion in United States v.
Chestman:
Information is . . . expensive to produce, and, because it involves
facts and ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried in one's
head, there is a ubiquitous risk that those who pay to produce infor-
mation will see others reap the profit from it. Where the profit from
an activity is likely to be diverted, investment in that activity will
decline. If the law fails to protect property rights in commercial in-
72. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1252, n.266. The question for most
scholars no longer is whether some form of insider trading regulation is necessary and
appropriate to protect property rights in nonpublic information, but whether we should
make a federal case of it. See Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 Sup. CT.
ECON. REV. 123, 171 (1998) ("Misappropriation of information is wrong, but we should not
make a federal case out of it."). I take up that question infra notes 145-77 and accompany-
ing text.
73. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1252-57. An alternative approach is to
ask whether the parties, if they had bargained over the issue, would have assigned the
property right to the corporation or the inside trader. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider
Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 27-34
(1993).




formation, therefore, less will be invested in generating such
information.75
Accordingly, society provides incentives for inventive activity by using
the patent system to give inventors a property right in new ideas. By
preventing competitors from appropriating the idea, the patent allows the
inventor to charge monopolistic prices for the improved mousetrap,
thereby recouping his sunk costs. Trademark, copyright, and trade secret
law are all justified on similar grounds.
Granted, this argument may not provide quite as compelling a justifica-
tion for the insider trading prohibition as it does for the patent system.
Legalizing insider trading would likely have a much smaller impact on the
corporation's incentive to develop new information than would, say, le-
galizing patent infringement. It seems plausible, however, that insider
trading will have at least some impact on the incentive to produce new
information. Again, Judge Winter explains:
[I]nsider trading creates a risk that information will be prematurely
disclosed by such trading, and the corporation will lose part or all of
its property in that information. Although trades by an insider may
rarely affect market price, others who know of the insider's trading
may notice that a trader is unusually successful, or simply perceive
unusual activity in a stock and guess the information and/or make
piggyback trades. A broker who executes a trade for [an insider]
may well draw relevant conclusions. Or, as in the instant matter, the
trader... may tell his or her broker about the inside information,
who may then trade on his or her account, on clients' accounts, or
may tell friends and relatives. One inside trader has publicly attrib-
uted his exposure in part to the fact that the bank through which he
made trades piggybacked on the trades, as did the broker who made
the trades for the bank. Once activity in a stock reaches an unusual
stage, others may guess the reason for the trading-the corporate
secret. Insider trading thus increases the risk that confidential infor-
mation acquired at a cost may be disclosed. If so, the owner of the
information may lose its investment. 76
Even if one is skeptical that insider trading poses the sort of threats
Winter identifies, the affirmative case for assigning the property right to
the corporation is demonstrably stronger than the one for assigning it to
the insider, as I have explained elsewhere. 77 The law, therefore, should
assume (although the assumption may sometimes be wrong) that as-
signing the property right to the firm maximizes the social incentives for
the production of valuable new information.
There are essentially two ways of assigning a property right to informa-
tion: (1) allowing the owner to enter into transactions without disclosing
the information; or (2) prohibiting others from using the information. In
75. 947 F.2d 551,576-77 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
76. Id. at 577-78 (footnote and citations omitted).
77. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1255-56.
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effect, the federal insider trading prohibition vests a property right of the
latter type in the owner of nonpublic information. To be sure, enforce-
ment of the insider trading prohibition differs rather dramatically from
enforcement of, say, trespassing laws. In context, however, the prohibi-
tion's enforcement mechanisms are not inconsistent with a property
rights analysis. Where public policy argues for giving someone a property
right, but the costs of enforcing such a right would be excessive, the state
often uses its regulatory powers as a substitute for granting a property
right. Insider trading poses such a situation. Private enforcement of the
insider trading laws is rare and usually parasitic on public enforcement
proceedings.78 Indeed, as we shall see below, the very nature of insider
trading makes public regulation essential precisely because private en-
forcement is almost impossible. The insider trading prohibition's regula-
tory nature thus need not preclude a property rights-based analysis.
Although Judge Winter's Chestman opinion remains the most explicit
judicial acceptance of a property rights-based justification for regulating
insider trading, there were striking doctrinal parallels between insider
trading law pre-O'Hagan and other forms of property rights in informa-
tion. Using another's trade secret is actionable only if taking the trade
secret involved a breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, or theft, for
example, which was "an equally apt summary of the law of insider trading
after Chiarella and Dirks.'' 79 In light of such parallels, Winter speculated
that the property rights rationale explained both the Supreme Court's
decisions in Chiarella and Dirks, as well as the Second Circuit's adoption
of the misappropriation theory.80
Many aspects of the pre-O'Hagan prohibition in fact more consistent
with the property rights justification for the prohibition than they were
with a securities fraud-based justification. The basic function of a securi-
ties fraud regime is to ensure timely disclosure of accurate information to
investors. Yet, it seems indisputable that the insider trading prohibition
did not lead to increased disclosure. Consider the classic disclose or ab-
stain rule as the Second Circuit pronounced it in Texas Gulf Sulphur; the
rule's name was something of a misnomer, of course. The Second Circuit
presumably phrased the rule in terms of disclosure because a key element
of an omission case under Rule 10b-5 is that the defendant owed a duty
of disclosure to the investor on the other side of the transaction. As a
practical matter, however, disclosure was rarely an option. In Texas Gulf
Sulphur, for example, the company had no affirmative duty to disclose
the ore strike. As the Second Circuit correctly noted, the timing of dis-
closure was a matter for the business judgment of corporate managers,
subject to any affirmative disclosure requirements imposed by the stock
exchanges or the SEC.81 In this case, moreover, a valuable corporate
78. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading, supra note 31, at 15-17.
79. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 66, at 776.
80. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
81. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 851 n.12 (2d Cir.) (1968).
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purpose was served by delaying disclosure: confidentiality prevented
competitors from buying up the mineral rights and kept down the price
landowners would charge for them. The company, therefore, had no duty
to disclose the discovery, at least up until the time that the land acquisi-
tion program was completed. Given that the corporation had no duty to
disclose, and had decided not to disclose the information, the insiders'
fiduciary duties to the corporation precluded them from disclosing it for
personal gain. In this case, the company's president had specifically in-
structed insiders in the know to keep the information confidential, but
such an instruction was not technically necessary. Agency law precludes
a firm's agents from disclosing confidential information that belongs to
their corporate principal, as all information relating to the ore strike
clearly did. Disclosure by an insider who wishes to trade, therefore, was
only feasible if there was no legitimate corporate purpose for maintaining
secrecy. These situations are presumably rare; it is hard to imagine many
business developments that can be disclosed immediately without work-
ing some harm to the corporation. In most cases, the disclose or abstain
rule really does not provide the insider with a disclosure option. Instead,
the rule collapses into a rule of abstention. Accordingly, as a former SEC
Commissioner admitted, the "insider trading rules probably do not result
in more information coming into the market: the 'abstain or disclose'
rule for those entrusted with confidential information usually is observed
by abstention." 2
It is also telling that many of the prohibition's doctrinal oddities make
sense if protection of property rights is the true policy goal.8 3 Consider,
for example, the apparent incongruity that Winans could be held liable
for trading on information about the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the
Street," but the Journal could have lawfully traded on the same informa-
tion. As we saw above, this result makes no sense from a traditional se-
curities law perspective. From a property rights perspective, however, the
result in Carpenter makes perfect sense: because the information be-
longed to the Journal, it should be free to use the information as it saw fit,
while Winans's use of the same information amounted to a theft of prop-
erty owned by the Journal.
A property rights-based approach also helps make sense of a couple of
aspects of Dirks that are quite puzzling when approached from a securi-
ties fraud-based perspective. One is the Court's solicitude for market
professionals. After Dirks, market analysts were essentially exempt from
82. Cox & Fogarty, supra note 65, at 353.
83. To be sure, not all aspects of the federal prohibition can be so explained. For
example, because property rights generally include some element of transferability, it may
seem curious that federal law, at least in some circumstances, does not allow the owner of
nonpublic information to authorize others to use it for their own personal gain. See, e.g.,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (1998) (explaining that a tender offeror may not divulge its take-
over plans to anyone likely to trade in target stock). This does not undermine the general
validity of the property rights justification. Rather, if protection of property rights is taken
as a valid public-regarding policy basis for the prohibition, it gives us a basis for criticizing
departures from that norm.
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insider trading liability with respect to nonpublic information they de-
velop because they usually owe no fiduciary duty to the firms they re-
search. Dirks thus essentially assigned the property right to such
information to the market analyst rather than to the affected corporation.
From a disclosure-oriented perspective, this is puzzling; the analyst and/or
his clients will trade on the basis of information other investors lack.
From a property perspective, however, the rule is justifiable because it
encourages market analysts to expend resources to develop socially valu-
able information about firms and thereby promote market efficiency.
84
An even more significant puzzle, which also becomes more easily expli-
cable from a property rights perspective, was the Supreme Court's failure
in Chiarella and Dirks to precisely define the basis upon which liability
was to be imposed. Did it suffice to show that a fiduciary relationship
existed between the inside trader and those with whom she traded (or the
source of the information in the case of the misappropriation theory)?
Or was it necessary to show that the trade breached a specific fiduciary
duty arising out of such a relationship? If the latter, what duty was the
relevant one? The Court was never very clear on this issue, but a number
of passages in Dirks implied that it was a breach of the fiduciary duty
against self-dealing, not merely the existence of a fiduciary relationship or
a breach of a duty of confidentiality, that was at issue. The Court, for
example, described the elements of an insider trading violation as: "(i)
the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfair-
ness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information
by trading without disclosure." 85 Another passage likewise describes in-
sider trading liability as arising from "the 'inherent unfairness involved
where one takes advantage' of 'information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."
86
Yet another noted that insiders are "forbidden by their fiduciary relation-
ship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their ad-
vantage. ' 87 The focus in each instance is on the duty to refrain from self-
dealing. From a disclosure oriented approach, in which maximizing dis-
closure is the principal policy goal, such a focus makes no sense because
requiring such a breach limits the class of cases in which disclosure is
made. In contrast, from a property rights perspective, these passages
make perfect sense, because they focus attention on the basic issue of
whether the insider had converted information belonging to the
corporation.
While it seems clear that society needs some regulation of insider trad-
ing to protect property rights in corporate information, it is not at all
clear that securities fraud is the right vehicle for doing so. To the con-
84. See MACEY, supra note 66, at 21-22.
85. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653-54 (1983) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227).
86. Id. at 654 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968)).
87. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658.
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trary, securities fraud has proven to be a regrettable choice. As both the
prohibition and the Supreme Court's general Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence
evolved, serious doctrinal tensions between the two emerged.
The federal insider trading prohibition has its statutory basis in Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 there-
under. Both sweep broadly, capturing "any" fraudulent or manipulative
conduct "in connection with" the purchase or sale of "any" security. De-
spite the almost breathtaking expanse of regulatory authority Congress
thereby delegated to the Commission, the Supreme Court has "warned
against expanding the concept of fraud in the securities context beyond
what the words of the Act reasonably will bear."88 As the misappropria-
tion theory came under attack prior to O'Hagan, that warning took on
special significance. From a strict textualist perspective, the validity of
the misappropriation theory depended upon whether: (1) the deceit, if
any, worked by the misappropriator on the source of the information
constitutes deception as the term is used in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5;
and (2) any such deceit is deemed to have occurred "in connection with"
the purchase or sale of a security.8 9
In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit defined fraud, as the term is used in Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, "as the making of a material misrepresenta-
tion or the nondisclosure of material information n violation of a duty to
disclose."'9 So defined, fraud is present in a misappropriation case only
in a technical and highly formalistic sense. Although a misappropriator
arguably deceives the source of the information, any such deception is
really quite inconsequential. The source of the information presumably is
injured, if at all, not by the deception, but by the conversion of the infor-
mation by the misappropriator for his own profit. Hence, it is the breach
of fiduciary duty, if any, by the misappropriator that is truly objectiona-
ble, while any deception is purely incidental. So understood, the misap-
propriation theory appears to run afoul of the Supreme Court's holding
in Santa Fe that a mere breach of duty cannot give rise to Rule 10b-5
liability.91
Santa Fe had attempted to freeze out minority shareholders of one of
its subsidiaries by means of a statutory short-form merger. While plain-
tiff-shareholders had a state law remedy available in the statutory ap-
praisal rights provision, they chose to seek redress under Rule 10b-5
instead. They claimed that the merger violated Rule 10b-5 because the
deal was effected without prior notice to the minority shareholders and
88. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Central Bank v.
First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 174 (1994)).
89. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944-46.
90. Id. at 944.
91. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). See also Bain-
bridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1258-61 (discussing the federalism implications of in-
sider trading regulations); Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading




was done without any legitimate business purpose. They also claimed
that their shares had been fraudulently under-valued. The Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action under Rule
10b-5.92 The Court opined that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were only
intended to reach deception and manipulation neither of which was pres-
ent in the case at bar.93
Santa Fe's requirement that conduct involve deception in order to fall
within Rule 10b-5's scope featured prominently in the reasoning of those
circuit courts that rejected the misappropriation theory. For example, in
Bryan, the Fourth Circuit opined that "the misappropriation theory does
not even require deception, but rather allows the imposition of liability
upon the mere breach of fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of
trust and confidence. '94 As such, the Bryan court concluded that the the-
ory ran afoul of Santa Fe.95
Of even greater potential relevance to the problem at hand, however, is
the Santa Fe Court's concern that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs
would result in federalizing much of state corporate law-in many cases
overriding well-established state policies of corporate regulation.96 In
fact, Santa Fe is part of a fairly long line of securities law cases in which
the Supreme Court camd down on the states side of federalism disputes.
For example, the Court has emphasized that "state regulation of corpo-
rate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attrib-
utes are a product of state law,"' 97 from which the Court extrapolated the
proposition that "[i]t... is an accepted part of the business landscape in
this country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers,
and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares." 98 In
keeping with that principle, the Court emphasized that state law governs
the rights and duties of corporate directors: "[A]s we have said in the
past, the first place one must look to determine the powers of corporate
directors is in the relevant State's corporation law... . 'Corporations are
creatures of state law'.., and it is state law which is the font of corporate
directors' powers." 99
92. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476.
93. See id. at 472.
94. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 948. This interpretation of the misappropriation theory is clearly
incorrect post-O'Hagan, in light of the Supreme Court's clear requirement that the source
of the information be deceived, see infra Part IV.A, and arguably misreads the pre-
O'Hagan circuit court decisions endorsing the theory. Although courts adopting the mis-
appropriation theory recognized that Rule 10b-5 only encompasses fraud and manipula-
tion, they held that the deception the misappropriator works on the source of the
information sufficed to impose liability on him. See e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947
F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991).
95. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949.
96. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478-79.
97. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
98. Id. at 91. See also id. at 89 ("No principle of corporation law and practice is more
firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations....
99. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (citations omitted).
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The insider trading prohibition co-exists uneasily with these principles.
For example, in Santa Fe, the Court held that Rule 10b-5 did not reach
claims "in which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were
treated unfairly by a fiduciary."''0° This, however, is the very essence of
the complaint made in insider trading cases. The Court also held that
extension of Rule lOb-5 to breaches of fiduciary duty was unjustified in
light of the state law remedies available to plaintiffs.101 Likewise, insider
trading plaintiffs have available state law remedies. 0 2 Granted, these
remedies vary from state to state and are likely to prove unavailing in
many cases. The same was true, however, of the state law remedy at issue
in Santa Fe.'0 3 Finally, the Court expressed reluctance "to federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overridden.' 0 4 But this is precisely what the federal
insider trading prohibition did.
Thus, Santa Fe is a serious doctrinal problem for proponents of an in-
sider trading prohibition grounded in securities fraud. The Santa Fe
"problem" figured prominently in Bryan's rejection of the misappropria-
tion theory.'0 5 Unfortunately, Santa Fe also poses a serious obstacle for
those of us favoring a property rights-based justification for the insider
trading prohibition. As the Fourth Circuit put it: "the misappropriation
theory transforms Section 10(b) from a rule intended to govern and pro-
tect relations among market participants who are owed duties under the
securities laws into a federal common law governing and protecting any
and all trust relationships."'' 6 This is precisely what a property rights
approach mandates, but it also amounts to "the effective federalization of
[fiduciary] relationships historically regulated by the states,"'0 7 which is
precisely what Santa Fe was intended to prevent.
Unfortunately, Santa Fe is not the only doctrinal hurdle that must be
overcome. Until quite recently, Rule 10b-5 was regarded as an example
of interstitial lawmaking in which the courts used common-law adjudica-
tory methods to flesh out the text's bare bones. In Central Bank of Den-
ver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, 0 8 however, the Supreme Court held
that there was no implied private right of action against those who aid
and abet violations of Rule lOb-5.109 Central Bank thus substantially lim-
ited the scope of secondary liability under the Rule, at least insofar as
private party causes of action are concerned. For our purposes, however,
the case is more significant for its methodology than its holding. The
100. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477.
101. See id. at 478.
102. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1218-27.
103. See id. at 1259.
104. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479.
105. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945, 948.
106. Id. at 950.
107. Id. at 951.
108. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
109. See id. at 191.
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Court held that the scope of conduct prohibited by Section 10(b) (and
thus Rule 10b-5) is controlled by the text of the statute." 0 Where the
plain text does not resolve some aspect of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action,
courts must "infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the is-
sue had the 10b-5 action been included as an express provision of the
1934 Act."" I1
Central Bank figured even more prominently than Santa Fe in the rea-
soning of the Fourth and Eighth Circuit opinions rejecting the misappro-
priation theory. In O'Hagan, for example, the Eighth Circuit interpreted
the statutory prohibition of fraud created by Section 10(b) narrowly to
exclude conduct constituting a "mere breach of a fiduciary duty."112 In-
stead, "the Court [captured] only conduct constituting a material misrep-
resentation or the nondisclosure of material information in violation of a
duty to disclose as statutorily prohibited."'1 3 Because it believed the mis-
appropriation theory permits the imposition of Section 10(b) liability
based upon a breach of fiduciary duty without any such deception, the
Eighth Circuit held that the theory was inconsistent with the plain statu-
tory text of Section 10(b) and, accordingly, invalid under Central Bank."14
The Eighth Circuit further invoked Central Bank to strictly construe
the statutory limitation that the requisite deception be committed "in
connection with" a securities transaction,11 5 which requirement the court
contended the misappropriation theory rendered "nugatory."11 6 Specifi-
cally, the court held that Section 10(b) reaches "only a breach of a duty to
parties to the securities transaction or, at the most, to other market par-
ticipants such as investors."11 7 Absent such a limitation, the court
opined, Section 10(b) would be transformed "into an expansive 'general
fraud-on-the-source theory' which seemingly would apply to an infinite
number of trust relationships."'1 8 Such an expansive theory of liability,
the court further opined, could not be justified by the text of statute. 119
In the typical misappropriation case, of course, the source of the informa-
tion is not the affected purchaser or seller. Often the source is not even a
contemporaneous purchaser or seller and frequently has no state in any
110. See id. at 178.
111. Id. at 178 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins.. 508 U.S. 286,294
(1993)). The Court admits this is an "awkward task." Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359 (1991). Justice Scalia put it more colorfully: "We
are imagining here." Id. at 366. Central Bank constrained this imaginative process by re-
quiring courts to "use the express causes of action in the securities Acts as the primary
model for the § 10(b) action." Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 178.
112. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617-18.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 618.
115. Id. at 618.
116. Id. at 617.
117. Id. at 618. In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit similarly opined that Section 10(b) is pri-
marily concerned with deception of purchasers and sellers of securities, and at most ex-
tends to fraud committed against other persons closely linked to, and with a stake in, a
securities transaction. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946.
118. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 619 (quoting Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950).
119. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 619.
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affected securities transaction. In Carpenter, for example, the Wall Street
Journal was neither a purchaser nor a seller of the affected securities, nor
did it have a financial stake in any of the affected transactions. 120 Simi-
larly, in Bryan, the state of West Virginia was neither a purchaser nor
seller, and it had no direct stake in Bryan's securities transactions. In
neither case did the defendant fail to disclose material information to a
market participant to whom he owed a duty of disclosure. Even assuming
the misappropriator deceived the source of the information, one must sig-
nificantly stretch the phrase "in connection with" to bring that fraud
within the statute's ambit. As the Fourth Circuit put it: "[tihe misappro-
priation of information from an individual who is in no way connected to,
or even interested in, securities is simply not the kind of conduct with
which the securities laws, as presently written, are concerned.' 121
Much commends the Eighth and Fourth Circuits' interpretation of Sec-
tion 10(b). The courts carefully considered the Supreme Court's relevant
precedents, especially Santa Fe and Central Bank. At least insofar as the
misappropriation theory imposes liability solely on the basis of a breach
of fiduciary duty to the source of the information, without any require-
ment that the alleged perpetrator has deceived the persons with whom he
traded or other market participants, it ran afoul of those precedents. In
contrast, as the Eighth Circuit correctly opined, the lower court decisions
endorsing the misappropriation theory generally failed to conduct a rigor-
ous analysis of Section 10(b)'s text or the pertinent Supreme Court
decisions. 122
Yet, there were problems applying Central Bank to the insider trading
prohibition. Although the Fourth Circuit was careful to opine that Bryan
left intact both the disclose or abstain theory of liability and tipping liabil-
ity thereunder, this was arguably not the case. As we have seen, the duty
at issue in tipping cases is not a duty to disclose, but rather a duty to
refrain from self-dealing in confidential information owed by the tipper
to the source of the information. As such, tipping is subject to the same
line of attack invoked by the Bryan court against the misappropriation
theory. Even the basic disclose or abstain theory of liability was called
into question by Bryan. Granted, insider trading in violation of the dis-
close or abstain rule involves an element of deception. By definition, the
defendant fails to disclose non-public information before trading. The
nondisclosure argument, however, is not a very powerful explanation for
insider trading liability. Persons subject to the disclose or abstain theory
are often also subject to a duty of confidentiality, precluding them from
120. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 22 (1987).
121. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950.
122. In a telling passage of his partial dissent to a leading Second Circuit opinion en-
dorsing and fleshing out the misappropriation theory, Judge Winter acknowledged that the
misappropriation theory lacked "any obvious relationship" to the statutory text of Section
10(b) because "theft rather than fraud or deceit" had become "the gravamen of the prohi-
bition." United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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disclosing the information. As we have seen, the insider trading prohibi-
tion becomes a rule to abstain from trading, rather than a rule requiring
disclosure or abstention. In other words, given that the defendant had no
right to disclose, it is the failure to abstain from trading, rather than the
nondisclosure, which is the basis for imposing liability. The inexorable
logic of both Bryan and the Eighth Circuit's O'Hagan opinion called into
question not just the misappropriation theory, but the entire federal in-
sider trading prohibition. 123
A further problem is that the texts provide little guidance as to the
scope of insider trading liability. Recall that, under Central Bank, if the
text does not resolve some aspect of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action,
courts must infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue
if Rule 10b-5 had been included as an express provision of the 1934
Act.124 As noted, Central Bank somewhat constrained this imaginative
process by requiring courts to use the express causes of action in the se-
curities acts as the primary model for interpreting Rule 10b-5. 125 As ap-
plied to insider trading, however, this approach is not especially helpful.
The short-swing profits cause of action under Section 16(b) of the Ex-
change Act regulates insider trading only indirectly, does not seek to de-
fine insider trading, and does not involve questions of fiduciary duty.
Likewise, Section 20A provides an express private right of action for in-
sider trading, but was not adopted until more than fifty years after Sec-
tion 10(b), and moreover, provides no substantive definition of insider
trading. Similarly, Section 21A creates a treble money civil penalty for
insider trading, but suffers from the same flaws as Section 20A insofar as
it might be used as a source of imaginatively reconstructing congressional
intent with respect to Section 10(b).
If we take into account evidence of congressional intent other than the
express provisions of the statute, it becomes clear that extending Central
Bank to the insider trading context would negate rather than further
Congress' intent. There is good evidence that Congress in 1934 did not
intend to regulate insider trading in any way other than through the
short-swing profit provisions of Section 16(b). 126 Since 1934, however,
Congress has twice amended the Exchange Act for the specific purpose
of enhancing the penalties associated with insider trading.127 In so doing,
it consistently encouraged vigorous SEC enforcement of the federal in-
123. Put another way, the nondisclosure argument is circular. As Chiarella made clear,
and Dirks affirmed, not all failures to disclose are fraudulent. Rather, a nondisclosure is
actionable only if the trader is subject to a duty to disclose. In turn, a duty to disclose
exists only where the trader is subject to a fiduciary duty to refrain from self-dealing in
confidential information. Absent such a fiduciary duty, insider trading simply is not fraud-
ulent. Once again, this leaves the disclose or abstain rule subject to the same line of attack
adopted by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits.
124. See supra text accompanying note 111.
125. See supra note 111.
126. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1229-30.
127. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376,
98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
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sider trading prohibition. 128 This sort of ex post facto indication of legisla-
tive intent is usually viewed skeptically. In this instance, however, the
recent amendments arguably constitute an authoritative congressional
endorsement of the insider trading prohibition. 129
Under the so-called re-enactment doctrine, where Congress revises a
statute without reversing prior on-point judicial holdings, that failure has
been taken as evidence of congressional approval of those prior hold-
ings.130 In adopting neither the 1984 Insider Trading Sanctions Act nor
the 1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, did Con-
gress see fit to reverse either Rule 14e-3 or the misappropriation theory.
To the contrary, the legislative history of both acts is replete with state-
ments of congressional approval of those theories.13' Indeed, Section 2
of the 1988 Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act provides an
express congressional finding that the SEC's rules "governing trading
while in possession of material, nonpublic information are, as required by
such Act, necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the
protection of investors.' 32 The accompanying House Report further
states that "these findings are intended as an expression of congressional
support for these regulations." 133 Moreover, on the substantive level, the
1988 Act overruled Moss v. Morgan, Stanley Inc.,34 in which the Second
Circuit held that private parties lacked standing to sue under the misap-
propriation theory. The 1988 Act expressly created a private party cause
of action for insider trading cases. Because a private party cause of ac-
tion existed as to all other types of insider trading violations, however,
Congress's conduct can only be interpreted as a clear legislative endorse-
ment of the misappropriation theory.
At least insofar as it applies to insider trading cases arising under Rule
lOb-5, Central Bank placed the reenactment doctrine in serious jeopardy.
The Central Bank majority remarked that arguments based on the re-
enactment doctrine "deserve little weight in the interpretive process.' 35
The Court also held that because "Congress has not reenacted the lan-
guage of § 10(b) since 1934," it did not need to "determine whether the
other conditions for applying the reenactment doctrine are present.' 36
Hence, even if Congress intended that the 1984 and 1988 amendments
expressly endorse the misappropriation theory, Central Bank counsels
disregarding that intent. Extension of this aspect of Central Bank to the
128. See e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 100-910 (1988), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043.
129. For a more exhaustive defense of the proposition that the 1984 and 1988 legislation
constitute implicit congressional validation and authorization of both the misappropriation
theory and Rule 14e-3, see Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation,
50 VAND. L. REV. 1091 (1997).
130. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378
(1982).
131. See e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 910, supra note 128, at 10, 26; H.R. Rep. No. 98-355 (1983).
132. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
133. H.R. Rep. No. 910, supra note 128, at 35.
134. 719 F.2d 5, 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
135. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 187.
136. Id. at 185.
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insider trading context, however, would be just as problematic as the ex-
tension of its main holding. Rejecting the re-enactment doctrine as au-
thority for the misappropriation theory simply because Section 10(b) has
never been re-enacted ignores highly relevant congressional action else-
where in the Act, and thus flouts the apparent congressional intent. If
only the intent of the 1934 Congress is relevant, after all, the evidence
suggests that Section 10(b) was not concerned with insider trading and
the prohibition as a whole should be overturned. This would negate the
subsequently adopted statutory penalties for insider trading because
there no longer would be any underlying violation to which they could be
applied, which is an anomalous result, at best. Should penalties Congress
adopted with the clear intent that they be applied to misappropriation of
information be rendered nugatory by judicial rejection of the underlying
cause of action?
In light of these considerations, reconciling the insider trading prohibi-
tion with Central Bank loomed as one of the major doctrinal problems
facing the Supreme Court in O'Hagan. It also looms as a major obstacle
to a property rights-based understanding of the prohibition. Such an un-
derstanding would premise liability on theft, not deception. Because the
text of Section 10(b), or Rule 10b-5, clearly addresses deceit, not conver-
sion of intellectual property, the strict textualist approach to statutory in-
terpretation mandated by Central Bank proscribes such an
understanding.
E. STARTING OVER VERSUS FILLING POT HOLES
In the road parable, the city council faces a difficult question. Should it
simply repair the road, filling in pot holes and the like, or should it tackle
the much harder job of straightening the road? In the former case, users
of the road will have to put up with the inefficiencies its curve creates. In
the latter case, however, there will be greater expense and potential
resistance from adversely affected interest groups (such as owners of land
facing the present road or through which the new road would pass).
In United States v. O'Hagan,137 the Supreme Court faced a similar di-
lemma. The Court had previously taken up the misappropriation theory
in Carpenter v. United States,138 in which a Wall Street Journal reporter
and his confederates misappropriated information belonging to the Jour-
nal. The Supreme Court upheld the resulting convictions under the mail
and wire fraud statutes, holding that confidential business information is
property protected by those statutes from being taken by trick, deceit,
and chicanery. 139 As to the defendants' securities fraud convictions, how-
ever, the Court split 4-4. Following the long-standing tradition governing
evenly divided Supreme Court decisions, 140 the lower court ruling was
137. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
138. 484 U.S. 19, 23 (1987).
139. See id. at 28.
140. See Neal v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
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affirmed without opinion, but that affirmation had no precedential or
stare decisis value.
Thus, the way was left open for the Supreme Court to revisit the misap-
propriation theory in O'Hagan.141 James O'Hagan was a partner in the
Minneapolis law firm of Dorsey & Whitney. In July 1988, Grand Metro-
politan PLC ("Grand Met"), retained Dorsey & Whitney in connection
with its planned takeover of Pillsbury Company. Although O'Hagan was
not one of the lawyers on the Grand Met project, he learned of their
intentions and began buying Pillsbury stock and call options on Pillsbury
stock. When Grand Met announced its tender offer in October, the price
of Pillsbury stock rose to nearly $60 per share. O'Hagan then sold his
Pillsbury call options and common stock, making a profit of more than
$4.3 million. O'Hagan subsequently was indicted and convicted on vari-
ous charges, the most pertinent for our purposes being that he violated
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by trading on misappropriated non-public
information. 142 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's con-
viction, becoming the second court of appeals (joining the Fourth Circuit)
to reject the misappropriation theory.143 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the resulting circuit split.
The Court then had an opportunity to rethink the entire problem.
How did the federalism principles of Santa Fe apply to insider trading?
Further, how did statutory interpretation methodology of Central Bank
affect insider trading? Like the city council in the road parable, the Court
could content itself with patching over the various doctrinal tensions that
permeated the misappropriation theory, or it could start over more or
less from scratch and erect an entirely new statutory edifice.
Before evaluating what the Supreme Court chose to do, it is useful to
further examine the options presented to it. One option was to do away
with insider trading regulation in its entirety. Henry Manne's seminal
work on insider trading offers a policy justification for this option,144 but
it does not appear that the Supreme Court ever seriously considered it.
141. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
142. O'Hagan was also indicted for violations of Rule 14e-3, which proscribes insider
trading in connection with tender offers, and the federal mail fraud and money laundering
statutes. The Eighth Circuit overturned O'Hagan's convictions under those provisions. As
to Rule 14e-3, the court held that the SEC lacked authority to adopt a prohibition of in-
sider trading that does not require a breach of fiduciary duty. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 622-
27. As to O'Hagan's mail fraud and money laundering convictions, the Eighth Circuit also
reversed them on grounds that the indictment was structured so as to premise the charges
under those provisions on the primary securities fraud violations. See id. at 627-28. Ac-
cordingly, in view of the court's reversal of the securities fraud convictions, the latter
counts could not stand either. The Supreme Court reversed on all points, reinstating
O'Hagan's convictions under all of the statutory violations charged in the indictment. See
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678.
143. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 628.
144. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 163-66
(1966); Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV., Nov./Dec.,
1966, at 113, 120-22; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 547, 581 (1970); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New
Information, 4 CATO J. 933 (1985).
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In any event, with the emergence of the property rights justification for
regulating insider trading, there appears to be little academic support for
deregulation today, even in law and economics circles.
Another option recently proposed by Larry Ribstein suggests repealing
the federal insider trading prohibition, returning regulatory jurisdiction
over to state common law. 145 Ribstein's analysis begins with a federal-
ism-based argument that the Supreme Court should adopt a basic inter-
pretive principal of limited federal government power. Having done so,
the Court "should require a fairly explicit indication of legislative intent
as a condition of any significant expansion of federal statute."' 46 As ap-
plied to Rule 10b-5, the Court should strictly interpret the term "decep-
tion" to encompass only conduct Congress clearly intended to regulate. 147
As applied to the problem at hand, Ribstein argues these principles man-
date repealing much of the federal insider trading prohibition and re-
turning principal regulatory jurisdiction over insider trading to the
states. 14
8
I am fully sympathetic with the federalism concerns that motivate this
proposal, as a general matter. Indeed, I am largely persuaded by Rib-
stein's cogent argument that leaving insider trading to the states would be
preferable-if we were starting from scratch. It is critical to remember,
however, that we do not write on a blank slate here. Texas Gulf Sulphur
set us on a path leading away from state corporate law fiduciary duties
and towards federal securities fraud law. The resulting evolutionary his-
tory cannot be ignored. In a passage of his Chestman opinion, pregnant
with path dependence implications, Judge Winter acknowledged that in-
sider trading regulation has little to do with traditional concepts of securi-
ties fraud. Nevertheless, he thought it too late to turn back:
It must be noted, however, that, although the [property rights] ra-
tionale... provides a policy for prohibiting a specific kind of insider
trading, any obvious relationship to Section 10(b) is presently miss-
ing because theft rather than fraud or deceit, seems the gravamen of
the prohibition .... Nevertheless, the law is far enough down this
road ... that a court of appeals has no option but to continue the
route.149
In terms of the road parable, Ribstein is arguing for the most ambitious
variant of the project: tearing up the existing road, clearing away the
homes and factories that have sprung up along it, and pushing through a
new road following a straighter and better path. As the parable suggests,
and Judge Winter seems to have recognized, however, doing so is some-
times too costly.
The approach I prefer begins with a recognition that the federal insider
trading prohibition is an empty shell, lacking force or substance until it
145. See Ribstein, supra note 72.
146. Id. at 153.
147. Id. at 152.
148. See id. at 166 ("state law should control").
149. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (Winter, J., dissenting in part).
1620 [Vol. 52
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
has been filled with fiduciary duty concepts. Indeed, it must be so or the
analysis becomes wholly circular. Chiarella and Dirks taught that silence
was not fraudulent under Rule 10b-5 unless there was a duty to disclose.
In turn, the duty to disclose arose when the inside trader had violated a
duty arising out of a fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of trust
and confidence. If Rule 10b-5 requires such a duty, but is also the source
of the requisite duty, the analysis is circular and meaningless.1 50 Accord-
ingly, the requisite fiduciary duty must come from a source outside Rule
10b-5 and, indeed, the federal securities laws as a whole.
Development of the requisite duty should be driven by the property
rights rationale for regulating insider trading. As we have seen, pre-
O'Hagan law was consistent with the property rights rationale, but had
not explicitly adopted it. My proposal mandates an explicit embrace of
that rationale. The governing question thus becomes: did the defendant
convert nonpublic information belonging to another for personal gain?
In rare cases, the defendant may be a complete stranger to the source of
the information (one thinks of the scene in Wall Street in which Charlie
Sheen's character breaks into an office). In such cases, a Rule 10b-5 dis-
closure obligation should be imposed if the defendant's conduct violated
applicable state laws governing theft of confidential information. In the
more usual case, the inside trader and the source of the information are
likely to be in a relationship that is arguably fiduciary in character: attor-
ney/client, doctor/patient, employer/employee, etc. In such cases, federal
courts should look to state law (specifically the law of the state of incor-
poration of the issuer) to determine whether a relationship is in fact fidu-
ciary in character, such that the fiduciary is potentially subject to the
misappropriation theory, and if so, whether the fiduciary relationship in
question includes a duty to refrain from self-dealing in non-public infor-
mation belonging to the principal.
In my judgment, this approach is superior to one in which all or even a
substantial chunk of the responsibility for regulating insider trading is de-
volved to the states. The affirmative case for devolving responsibility to
the states rests on a number of premises with which I am unable to con-
cur. For example, Larry Ribstein's argument rests on an admittedly at-
tractive (at least to me) interpretative principle of limited federal
government power. In turn, that principle is derived, inter alia, from a
close reading of recent Supreme Court opinions that address the issue of
federalism. 51 One difficulty with this argument is that the federalism is-
sues raised by the misappropriation theory were ably presented to the
Supreme Court in O'Hagan by an amicus brief written by law professors
Richard Painter, Kim Krawiec, and Cindy Williams.1 52 As we shall see,
however, the Court blithely ignored the concerns they identified.
150. See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 290-92
(1996).
151. See Ribstein, supra note 72, at 149-54.
152. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in Support of Respondent,
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842).
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A related problem is that the interpretative principle of limited federal
government power allows for a federal insider trading prohibition so long
as Congress gives "a fairly explicit indication" that Section 10(b) is in-
tended to reach the conduct in question. 153 Here Ribstein and I simply
disagree as to the import of the 1984 and 1988 insider trading legislation.
Ribstein contends that the 1988 legislation provides little support for the
misappropriation theory, especially in light of Central Bank's limitations
upon the re-enactment doctrine.154 As discussed above, I regard the 1984
and 1988 Acts as a strong statement of Congressional support for the
misappropriation theory, albeit one that left development of the substan-
tive elements of the theory to the courts.
Finally, the affirmative case for devolution rests in part on the claim
that, as laboratories of democracy, states provide heterogeneity, experi-
mentation, and competition. 155 Heterogeneity and experimentation are
desirable, but the power of the path dependence metaphor is its reminder
that they do not inexorably lead to efficient outcomes. The fittest do not
always survive. State anti-takeover legislation is a widely accepted exam-
ple of such a case. As the story goes, state competition for corporate
charters generally leads to more efficient corporate laws, but interest
group pressures and a variety of other market failures led states to adopt
inefficient takeover rules.156 Query whether insider trading would not
prove another case in which interest group pressures lead to inefficient
results? Recall that the political interests that support the modern prohi-
bition are: (1) the SEC's bureaucratic incentives; and (2) market profes-
sionals. By a fortuitous happenstance, which illustrates the ways in which
path dependent evolution of a legal regime can sometimes lead to desira-
ble outcomes despite dubious starting places, their selfish political inter-
ests are potentially reconcilable with a regime focused on protecting
property fights in non-public information. Because market professionals
are concentrated in a few major financial centers, their influence on the
evolution of state common law is likely to be far less pronounced than
their influence on the development of federal securities law. As such,
state common law is likely to be more responsive in a public choice sense
to the interests of local corporate managers than those of distant market
professionals.
In any event, once interest groups are introduced into the equation,
devolution is exposed as a nonstarter. If politics is the art of the possible,
so is law reform. Given the political interests supporting the current pro-
hibition, devolution will remain a theoretical idea at best for the foresee-
able future. There is no organized constituency that favors devolution,
while strong interest groups would oppose it. Moreover, devolution
153. Ribstein, supra note 72, at 153.
154. See id. at 142-43.
155. See id. at 155-57.
156. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 218-23 (1991) (describing the benefits of competiton
among states for corporate charters).
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would run counter to the institutional interests of the SEC and Congress.
Insider trading is still unpopular with the public and with Congress, pro-
viding the SEC with political cover for deregulation in other areas and
justification for expansive enforcement budgets. Indeed, the misappro-
priation theory itself bears witness to the SEC's interest in maintaining an
expansive insider trading prohibition. 157
I now turn from a critique of the case for devolution to an affirmative
defense of federalizing insider trading regulation. According to the eco-
nomics of path dependence, the mere fact that the initially chosen start-
ing point is arbitrary or even tainted by self-interest does not necessarily
require one to conclude that that assignment was inefficient. Path depen-
dence results in a market failure only if the initial starting point results in
inefficient outcomes, and the costs of reversing the initial choice are suffi-
ciently high that the path leading to those outcomes resists correction by
market forces. If insider trading is socially undesirable and the SEC is
the least cost enforcer, assigning it regulatory authority is defensible,
even if the initial assignment was tainted by the agency's self-interest.
I have argued elsewhere that the SEC has a substantial comparative
advantage vis-a-vis other potential enforcers of an insider trading prohibi-
tion.' 58 To briefly recapitulate, the argument runs as follows: insider trad-
ing is hard to detect and difficult to successfully prosecute. Early in my
career I estimated that fewer than one in five cases of insider trading is
successfully prosecuted, 59 and in retrospect that estimate is probably too
high by several orders of magnitude. It is often very difficult to tell when
insider trading is taking place, and even when insider trading is suspected.
Further, it is very difficult to identify the responsible party if many people
had access to the information.
As a result, the police powers available to the Commission, but not to
private parties, t60 are essential to detecting insider trading. Other duty of
loyalty questions, such as usurpation of corporate opportunities and in-
terested director transactions, are appropriately left to private party en-
forcement under state corporate law because they are both rare and
157. One response to this argument might be that the argument for repeal is directed to
courts rather than Congress or the SEC. To be sure, the prohibition is a judicial creation,
which courts, in theory, could repeal. Such an argument overlooks the 1984 and 1988 in-
sider trading legislation, which arguably codified the prohibition. At the very least, that
legislation suggests judicial repeal of the prohibition would be followed by a Congressional
restoration. In any event, it was through the courts-not legislation or rule-making-that
the broad insider trading prohibition came into being. As we shall see below, O'Hagan
confirms the on-going judicial support for prohibiting insider trading via Rule 10b-5. See
infra Part IV.B.
158. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1263-66.
159. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984, 71 VA. L. REv. 455, 489-90 (1985) [hereinafter Bainbridge, A Critique of the In-
sider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984].
160. Under state corporate law, insider trading was left to private party enforcement.
Although state blue sky commissions have some regulatory authority over insider trading,
no state agency has vigorously pursued it. As a result, we can concentrate on the choice
between private party enforcement and SEC enforcement.
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comparatively easy to detect and prosecute. In a public corporation, op-
portunities to inside trade are likely to be much more common than are
opportunities for self-dealing transactions with the corporation. Insider
trading is also easier to hide. Transacting with the corporation necessarily
takes place in the open. In contrast, insider trading, which is conducted
on impersonal stock exchanges, lends itself to secrecy. Informants, com-
puter monitoring of stock transactions, and reporting of unusual activity
by self-regulatory organizations and/or market professionals are the usual
ways in which insider trading cases come to light. As a practical matter,
these techniques are available only to public law enforcement agencies.
In particular, they are most readily available to the SEC.
Unlike private parties, who cannot compel discovery until a non-frivo-
lous case has been filed, the Commission can impound trading records
and compel testimony simply because its suspicions are aroused.16' As
the agency charged with regulating broker-dealers and self-regulatory or-
ganizations, the Commission is also uniquely positioned to extract coop-
eration from securities professionals in conducting investigations. 162
Finally, the SEC is statutorily authorized to pay bounties to informants,
which is particularly important in light of the key role informants played
in breaking most of the big insider trading cases of the 1980s. 163
Internationalization of the securities markets is yet another reason for
believing the SEC has a comparative advantage in detecting and prose-
cuting insider trading. Sophisticated insider trading schemes often make
use of off-shore entities or even off-shore markets. The difficulties inher-
ent in extraterritorial investigations and litigation, especially in countries
with strong bank secrecy laws, probably would preclude private parties
from dealing effectively with insider trading involving off-shore activities.
In contrast, the SEC has developed memoranda of understanding with a
number of key foreign nations, which provide for reciprocal assistance in
prosecuting insider trading and other securities law violations.' 64 The
SEC's ability to investigate international insider trading cases was further
enhanced by the 1988 Act, which included provisions designed to en-
courage foreign governments to cooperate with SEC investigations. 165
Because insider trading is difficult to prosecute, even when detected,
allocating prosecutorial responsibility to the SEC may also be justified on
institutional expertise grounds. The Commission's enforcement staff will
handle many more insider trading cases than will counsel representing
private corporations. As such, they will develop greater expertise in han-
dling such prosecutions, which further enhances the Commission's com-
petitive advantage in dealing with insider trading.
161. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading, supra note 31, at 20.
162. See id.
163. See Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145, 164-66 (1989).
164. See id. at 172-73.
165. See id. at 171.
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While acknowledging the SEC's comparative advantage, Ribstein sug-
gested that the SEC could continue its market surveillance function, but
turn over misappropriation cases to state regulators and affected private
parties.' 66 The idea is an interesting and sophisticated one, but I am not
persuaded. Allocating regulatory authority to the SEC brings to bear not
only the agency's comparative advantage in detecting insider trading, but
also an array of sanctions unavailable to private parties. We know that
SEC monitoring detects only a small percentage of insider trading cases.
Because the probability of detection is quite low, and the potential gains
are quite high, the nominal sanction must be quite high in order to deter
insider trading. This is the basic economic rationale behind the draconian
penalties imposed on insider trading by the federal securities laws. They
combine public law enforcement, which enhances the probability of de-
tection, with onerous criminal and civil sanctions, which increases the
nominal sanction. In contrast, the sanction presently available in private
party litigation is limited to actual damages or disgorgement of actual
profits. While that sanction could be increased, perhaps by creation of
the same sort of treble money remedy that exists under the antitrust laws,
it may well be the case that criminal sanctions are needed for effective
deterrence.
Relying solely on private enforcement may also result in a market for
lemons. 167 Assume there are two groups of investors. One group be-
lieves insider trading is adverse to its interests and would prefer to invest
in firms that prohibit the practice. Accordingly, this group is willing to
pay more for stock issued by companies that adopt policies proscribing
insider trading. The other group is willing to allow insider trading by its
managers and is not willing to pay more for stock of companies with a
policy against insider trading. Unscrupulous corporate management
might try to lower the firm's cost of capital by adopting a policy against
insider trading, while also getting the benefit of insider trading by failing
to vigorously enforce the policy. 168 Given this potential market for lem-
ons, SEC enforcement of the insider trading prohibition may be Kaldor-
Hicks efficient. 169 Assuming most investors prefer that managers of their
166. See Ribstein, supra note 72, at 170.
167. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81, 89 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
168. A shareholder could sue derivatively, but such a lawsuit would be unlikely to suc-
ceed. Under Delaware law, for example, a suit on the stated facts likely would be a de-
mand required case. See Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992)
(demand required unless a majority of the board disabled by, inter alia, self-interest). If
demand was made and refused, as it likely would be, the business judgment rule would
insulate the refusal from review. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10
(Del. 1981). Unless the board wished to enforce the prohibition, an individual shareholder
probably would not be able to do so.
169. To be sure, assuming the market efficiently prices the stock of companies in which
managers go unpunished, a market for lemons may not develop. Will the market learn of
such failures? Will the market efficiently punish companies that fail to enforce their poli-
cies on insider trading? At the very least, proponents of devolution fairly can be asked to
bear the burden of proof on these issues.
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firms refrain from insider trading, SEC enforcement relieves them of the
costs associated with a regime of private enforcement-namely: (1) iden-
tifying which firms have adopted policies against insider trading; and (2)
differentiating between firms that credibly promise to enforce those poli-
cies and those whose promise is not credible.
A mandatory rule also may be Kaldor-Hicks efficient when viewed
from the firm's perspective. Assume there are two groups of firms: one
wishes to promise to refrain from insider trading and to provide a credi-
ble bond for that promise; the other does not. A mandatory rule backed
up by public enforcement and the threat of both criminal and civil sanc-
tions makes the latter group somewhat worse off, but makes the former
group considerably better off by making their bond much more credible.
In any case, the notion of creating a regime in which public agencies
detect wrongdoing, but then leave enforcement to private parties, strikes
me as odd. I suspect such regimes are rare, at best. Instead, where en-
forcement or other costs are such that private enforcement of property
rights is difficult, the law typically uses the state's regulatory powers as a
substitute for creating a property right. 170
Finally, the public choice barriers to devolution also stand as an obsta-
cle to this proposal. The SEC is unlikely to be enthusiastic about the
idea, and it seems unlikely that Congress would have much interest in
expending federal tax dollars on such a program.
In sum, I remain unconvinced by the affirmative arguments for devolu-
tion. Instead, I continue to prefer the approach I advanced several years
ago, pursuant to which state law fiduciary duty principles are incorpo-
rated into a federal insider trading prohibition. 171 Doing so provides an
exogenous source for the answers to the relevant questions, which obvi-
ates the circularity problem that arises if Rule 10b-5 is the source of those
answers. Although it leaves the insider trading problem in federal hands,
it somewhat alleviates the resulting federalism tensions by acknowledging
a role for state law. Finally, it is a limited and practical reform proposal,
which could fly under the radar screen of the interests that support the
current federal prohibition.
One objection to incorporating state law fiduciary duties into the fed-
eral insider trading prohibition is that doing so will lead to different re-
sults on similar facts in different states. In light of this risk some scholars
prefer a uniform federal common law of fiduciary obligation. 172 If the
policy justification for regulating insider trading is protection of the prop-
erty rights of the source of the information, however, there is no justifica-
tion for developing a uniform federal standard. Instead, the federal
government regulates insider trading because the SEC has a comparative
advantage over private parties in detecting and deterring insider trading.
As already noted, where private enforcement of property rights would be
170. See infra text accompanying notes 173-74.
171. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24.
172. See, e.g., Painter et al., supra note 72, at 206-07.
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prohibitively costly, we frequently observe state regulation as a substi-
tute. 173 We see this in the hunting area, for example, where private party
enforcement of property rights in wild animals (and to a lesser extent,
real property) would be quite costly. Accordingly, hunting regulation
substitutes for private property rights.174 Given that we are not surprised
that hunting regulation varies from state to state, why should we not be
equally sanguine about state to state variations in the protections af-
forded property rights in nonpublic information?
It might also be objected that relying on state law might lead to confu-
sion and forum shopping. But so what? Federalism has costs, one of
which is that choice of law issues sometimes result in confusion and/or
forum shopping. Alternatively, it might be suggested that questions relat-
ing to the definition of conduct regulated by the securities laws should be
answered uniformly. But why? Again, it is critical to understand that the
federal interest in regulating insider trading is largely a historical accident
driven and maintained by agency incentives and interest group pressure.
The case for uniformity in this context thus is much weaker than it is
where there are legitimate federal interests at stake.
An alternative objection to the idea of incorporating state law princi-
ples into the federal prohibition is offered by Larry Ribstein, who con-
tends that states will lack an incentive to develop applicable rules whose
sole function is to fill the empty shell at the heart of the federal insider
trading prohibition. 175 Indeed, states arguably lack a vehicle for doing so.
I am not persuaded by this objection, however. First, a substantial capital
stock of relevant state corporate law already exists. As Ribstein acknowl-
edges, the relevant capital stock includes all state cases dealing with prop-
erty rights in general and rights in information in particular, as opposed
to those dealing with insider trading176 States will still have an incentive
and a vehicle to develop that capital stock, despite the existence of a fed-
eral insider trading prohibition. Second, while Ribstein is correct that
what we are talking about is "the federal courts' version of state law, 177
federal courts are used to developing and applying state common law in
diversity cases and the various federal common law contexts into which
state law has been incorporated. There is no a priori reason doing so in
the insider trading context should prove any more difficult than it has
done in those other contexts.
The final and most serious objection to my proposal is that it is incon-
sistent with both the statutory interpretation methodology mandated by
Central Bank and the federalism principles announced in Santa Fe. I con-
cede the point, but offer the following defense: as we have seen, giving
those cases their full due would mandate repealing not just the misappro-
173. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36 (4th ed. 1992).
174. See id.
175. See Ribstein, supra note 72, at 169-70.
176. See id. at 158.
177. Id. at 170.
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priation theory, but also the rest of the federal insider trading prohibition.
This is politically unattainable and, in view of the SEC's comparative ad-
vantages in detecting and deterring insider trading socially undesirable.
This is a pragmatic defense for bypassing Central Bank and Santa Fe, but
part of the power of the path dependence metaphor is that it provides a
rationale for just this sort of pragmatism. 178 Again, I resort to Judge Win-
ter's cogent observation that "the law is far enough down this road...
that [we have] no option but to continue the route."' 79
Although a detailed critique of the strict textualism of Central Bank is
beyond the scope of this Article, a few comments thereon may be appro-
priate as further justification for my proposal. In effect, my argument is
that the Supreme Court should treat the insider trading prohibition as
though it were a species of federal common law. This approach arguably
is more consistent with the Supreme Court's traditional approach to Rule
10b-5 than was Central Bank. Justice Rehnquist famously observed that
Rule 10b-5 was "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn."'180 His comment reflects a Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence
that was an example of interstitial lawmaking in which the courts used
common-law adjudicatory methods to flesh out the bare statutory
bones.181 The Court routinely said that the starting point for its analysis
was the language of the statute, but the Court rarely stopped there. 182
178. I have elsewhere opined against "excessively pragmatic" statutory interpretation.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Colloquy: Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Deba-
cle, 50 Bus. LAW. 1231, 1253 (1995). In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995), the
Supreme Court substantially restricted the scope of liability under Securities Act, Section
12(a)(2). If the Court had not done so, Section 12(a)(2) might well have displaced Rule
lOb-5 as the principal vehicle for imposition of securities liability. Some commentators
have argued that the Supreme Court could appropriately take into account the effect a
broad interpretation of Section 12(a)(2) would have on Rule 10b-5 in the course of inter-
preting the former. See Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2), supra, at 1255, 1257. I
argued that "two wrongs don't make a right," contending that the Supreme Court's (argua-
bly) illegitimate creation of the implied right of action should not be used to thereafter
justify an incorrect interpretation of an express statutory right of action. Id. at 1256 n.159.
The core of my argument against Gustafson, however, is that the cart should not be put
before the horse: the mere fact that the rule 10b-5 cause of action is on the books and,
Central Bank notwithstanding, is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future, should
not control the interpretation of an express statutory provision. See id. at 1255-56. In
contrast, the present context involves the quite different question of how courts should
interpret the Rule 10b-5 cause of action itself. Notwithstanding my doubts about the legiti-
macy of the creation of implied private rights of action, fuller explication of which is best
left for another day, unless and until the Court overturns the Rule lob-5 cause of action, it
remains on the books and must be interpreted.
179. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (Winter, J., concurring in part) Interestingly, the
Supreme Court itself arguably adopted sub silentio a path dependence approach in
Chiarella. Instead of "making an ab initio determination of whether Section 10(b) prohib-
ited insider trading, the [Supreme] Court described the state of the caselaw... and im-
pliedly adopted [portions of] that caselaw." Id. at 575.
180. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
181. A former SEC solicitor opined that "[miodern development of the law of insider
trading is a classic example of common law in the federal courts. No statute defines insider
trading; no statute expressly makes it unlawful." Paul Gonson & David E. Butler, In Wake
of 'Dirks,' Courts Debate Definition of 'Insider', LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1984, at 16.
182. See e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Santa Fe
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Instead, the Court also looked to legislative history and to judicial and
administrative interpretations of the relevant provisions. In other words,
the Court engaged in an interpretative process little different from com-
mon law adjudication. As Judge Winter explained, the text of Section
10(b) can be seen as "a general authorization to the SEC and to the
courts to fashion rules founded largely on those tribunals' judgments as to
why insider trading is or is not fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." '183
As we have seen, such an approach appears to be consistent with congres-
sional intent as expressed by the 1984 and 1988 insider trading statutes,
which left the task of defining insider trading to the courts. In effect,
those statutes renewed Congress's invitation to the courts to develop the
insider trading prohibition through a process of common law adjudica-
tion. Moreover, as we shall see below, the interpretative methodology
(although not the result) applied in O'Hagan is closer to the model I pro-
pose than to that espoused in Central Bank.18 4
As to Santa Fe, we have seen that insider trading is qualitatively differ-
ent from the sorts of breaches of fiduciary duty that opinion protected
from being swallowed by Rule 10b-5. It is far more likely a corporation
would detect a director who usurped a corporate opportunity, for exam-
ple, than it is the corporation would detect a director who inside traded
on the basis of information belonging to the corporation. Given the
SEC's comparative advantage in detecting and deterring insider trading,
a pragmatist might well overlook the tension between Santa Fe and the
Chiarella/Dirks framework. In terms of the road parable, the cost of
straightening the road (i.e., achieving doctrinal purity) cannot be justified.
Patching the potholes may seem preferable, which in this context requires
one to accept some doctrinal inconsistencies, while seeking to craft a rule
that minimizes them.
Once we get past the Central Bank and Santa Fe hurdles and begin to
view the federal insider trading prohibition as a species of federal com-
mon law, there is well-established precedent for incorporating state law.
Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
197 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975).
183. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 573 (Winter, J., concurring in part).
184. Another way of reconciling my proposal (and the Supreme Court's O'Hagan deci-
sion, for that matter) with Central Bank is to focus not on its strict textualist interpretive
methodology, but rather its policy implications. Central Bank was one of a series of recent
Supreme Court securities law opinions that some observers believe rests on policy of limit-
ing private party litigation under Rule 10b-5. See Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2),
supra note 178, at 1254. If so, the Supreme Court may be more concerned with fidelity to
that policy outcome than to any particular interpretive methodology. Such an interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in this area is buttressed by the parallel imple-
mentation of that policy by Congress. The 1995 securities reform legislation and the
pending federal preemption legislation, in particular, have been motivated by a quite ap-
parent desire to restrain private party litigation in this area. See id. at 1254 n.153; accord
Langevoort, supra note 35, at 887-88. Because insider trading typically does not involve
private party litigation, the policy justification underlying Central Bank is inapplicable.
The principal difficulty with this argument is that it ascribes a greater degree of fidelity by
the court to a specific policy goal than may be plausible. See infra Part IV, B.
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In Burks v. Lasker,t85 for example, a shareholder of a federally regulated
investment company brought suit under the federal securities laws against
the company's board of directors. The Supreme Court held that state law
controlled the board of directors' ability to use a special litigation com-
mittee to terminate the litigation. 18 6 As another example, until quite re-
cently, the federal courts applied state statutes of limitation to private-
party lawsuits under Rule 10b-5.187 Although the Supreme Court
adopted a unique federal limitations period in Gilbertson, the Court indi-
cated that it would continue to borrow state statutes of limitations in ap-
propriate cases. 188
The standards for choosing between a uniform federal rule and incor-
poration of state law on a case-by-case basis are not well-developed, but
courts typically consider the impact incorporation of state law would have
on the relevant federal statutory policies. In Lampf, for example, the
Court created a unique federal statute of limitations for implied federal
rights of action because borrowing a state limitations rule would frustrate
the purpose of the underlying federal statute.189 In Burks, the Court used
state law to fill the interstices of a federal statute affecting the powers of
directors because doing so did not permit acts prohibited by the federal
statute, and was otherwise not inconsistent with the statutory policy.1t 0
Thus, the critical question seems to be whether there are important fed-
eral interests that would be adversely affected by adopting state law fidu-
ciary duty principles as the federal rule of decision.' 9 ' Here again, the
185. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
186. See id. at 486.
187. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 354 n.1
(1991) (citing cases).
188. See id. at 355-58. To be sure, while both of these examples involve the use of state
common law to fill the interstices of the federal securities laws, and thus suggest that state
law could appropriately play a role in insider trading prohibition as well, neither directly
addresses the use of state common law to define the elements of a federal claim. This too
is possible, however. In DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956), for example,
the Court looked to the state law definition of "children" for purposes of interpreting a
federal statute.
189. See Lampf 501 U.S. at 356.
190. See Burks, 441 U.S. at 479.
191. This interpretation is consistent with the test laid out in the leading case of United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979), in which the Supreme Court laid
out the following criteria for deciding when state law should be incorporated into federal
common law rules:
Undoubtedly, federal programs that "by their nature are and must be uni-
form in character throughout the Nation" necessitate formulation of control-
ling federal rules. Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally
uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of
decision. Apart from considerations of uniformity, we must also determine
whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the
federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules solicitous of those fed-
eral interests. Finally, our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to
which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships
predicated on state law.
Id. at 728-29 (citations omitted). To be sure, Kimball Foods is not squarely on point, be-
cause the occasion for creating federal common law arose in that case because the United
States was a party to the litigation rather than because the claim arose under federal law.
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path dependence metaphor proves useful. Applying it to the problem at
hand confirms that the federalization of the insider trading prohibition
was a historical accident whose continuation is largely justified by prag-
matic concerns of comparative advantage. There is no strong federal in-
terest at stake. As such, there is no need for a uniform federal rule.
It is important to note that while insider trading cases are often
brought by the federal government and arise under federal statute, in-
sider trading does not directly affect the rights of, nor threaten to impose
liability on the United States. Rather, as the breach of fiduciary duty
requirement itself suggests, insider trading mainly implicates private par-
ties' rights and obligations. Courts are more likely to impose uniform
national rules in the former case than in the latter.192
Incorporating state law into the federal common law of insider trading
will further ameliorate the doctrinal tension between Santa Fe and the
prohibition. Creating the federal insider trading prohibition involved
federalizing an area the states traditionally regulated. Texas Gulf Sulphur
easily might have been the first wedge in federalizing the entire body of
state corporate law. Santa Fe blunted that threat, but the insider trading
prohibition still lingers on the federal stage. By incorporating state law,
courts would minimize the extent to which the federal insider trading pro-
hibition intrudes on the state's legitimate zone of regulatory authority
over fiduciary duties. Doing so would advance the securities laws feder-
alism policies, without adversely affecting any other policy goals of those
laws.
Burks v. Lasker 93 especially supports this approach. Although the
cause of action clearly arose under federal law, the Court applied state
law because state law "is the font of corporate directors' powers" and
because state law application did not pose a "significant threat to any
identifiable federal policy or interest."'194 Burks thus strongly argues in
favor of using state law to supply the fiduciary duty element of the federal
insider trading prohibition. State law is the "font" of corporate fiduciary
duties, while state law incorporation poses no threat to "any identifiable
federal policy or interest.' 95
Although the Supreme Court's decision in DeSylva v. Ballentine'96
arose outside the securities law area, it is also quite instructive. In that
case, the Supreme Court was asked to decide what familial relationships
were encompassed by the term "children" as used in a federal statute.
The Court looked to state law for the term's definition. It did so in large
measure because there was no federal law of domestic relations:
It does confirm, however, the importance of determining whether incorporating state law
would adversely affect some federal policy.
192. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
193. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
194. let at 478-79 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
196. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
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The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that
does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state,
rather than federal law. This is especially true where a statute deals
with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic rela-
tions, which is primarily a matter of state concern. 197
From this perspective, DeSylva is an especially apt precedent for the
insider trading prohibition. Just as there was no general body of federal
domestic relations law, Santa Fe teaches that there is no general federal
law of fiduciary duty. Just as the Court incorporated state law in De-
Sylva, it thus should incorporate state law here.
The lesson of the road parable is that straightening a winding path is
not always wise. The securities fraud path upon which Texas Gulf
Sulphur put us turned out to be regrettable. It introduced substantial
doctrinal tensions that continue to plague the prohibition. Starting over
and devolving some or all of the regulatory responsibility to the states,
however, would be costly in at least two senses. First, we would lose the
benefit of the SEC's comparative advantage in detecting and deterring
insider trading. Second, just as straightening the road of the parable
would face opposition from the affected landowners, devolution would
bump up against strong opposing interests. A more modest approach,
such as explicitly incorporating state law fiduciary duty principles into the
federal prohibition, alleviates the doctrinal tensions that currently exist
(admittedly without solving them) and is less likely to face preclusive op-
position from affected interest groups. In terms of the road parable, it is
the functional equivalent of patching pot holes, but wise city councils
sometimes go that route.
IV. O'HAGAN
In the road parable, both proponents of straightening the road and pro-
ponents of simply patching the pot holes would agree that whatever the
city council decides, it should not make the situation worse. Unfortu-
nately, that is more or less what the Supreme Court did in O'Hagan. The
Court was presented with an important choice: it could continue down
the securities fraud path we had been on since Texas Gulf Sulphur, it
could redirect that path in a more explicitly property rights-oriented di-
rection, or it could pursue an entirely different path by eliminating the
misappropriation theory or even the prohibition itself. Unfortunately,
the Court chose the first option and kept the prohibition in its securities
fraud straight-jacket. Worse yet, in doing so it managed to (1) create new
and potentially challenging doctrinal problems; (2) exacerbate the doctri-
nal tensions between the prohibition on the one hand and both Central
Bank and Santa Fe on the other; and (3) weaken the protections that the
prohibition provides owners of nonpublic information. In most respects,
the Court left Rule 10b-5 in a worse state than it found it.




The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, thereby confirming
that the misappropriation theory is a valid basis on which to impose in-
sider trading liability. The majority (per Justice Ginsburg) acknowledged
that misappropriators, such as O'Hagan, have no disclosure obligation
running to the persons with whom they trade.198 Instead, it grounded
liability under the misappropriation theory on deception of the source of
the information.1 99 A fiduciary's undisclosed use of information belong-
ing to his principal, without disclosure of such use to the principal for
personal gain, constitutes fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security, and thus violates Rule 10b-5.
Although the Court thus rejected the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' posi-
tion, the version of the misappropriation theory it endorsed differed from
that which the lower courts had crafted. The majority explained that its
version of the misappropriation theory addressed the use of "confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to
the source of the information. ' 200 Accordingly, "a fiduciary's undis-
closed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell
securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the
principal of the exclusive use of that information. '201 Someone thus can
be held liable under this version of the misappropriation theory only
where one deceived the source of the information by failing to disclose
one's intent to trade on the basis of the information disclosed by the
source. This requirement follows, the majority opined, from the statutory
requirement that there be a "deceptive device or contrivance" used "in
connection with" a securities transaction.202 The Supreme Court thus re-
jected Chief Justice Burger's argument in Chiarella that the misappropri-
ation theory created a disclosure obligation, running to those with whom
the misappropriator trades.20 3 Instead, failure to disclose one's intentions
to the source of the information constitutes the requisite disclosure viola-
tion under the O'Hagan version of the misappropriation theory.2°4
In many respects, O'Hagan posed more questions than it answered.
Among these are:
1. Liability for brazen misappropriators? The O'Hagan majority made
clear that disclosure to the information's source is all that Rule 10b-5
required. If a brazen misappropriator discloses his trading plans to the
198. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 n.5. The principal dissent will not go down as one of
Justice Thomas' finest moments. It meanders down various inconsequential paths, explor-
ing such momentous questions as whether O'Hagan might have used the information he
misappropriated "in a fantasy stock trading game," while ignoring the very serious policy
and statutory interpretation questions posed by the misappropriation theory. Id. at 685.
199. See id. at 653.
200. Id. at 652.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 653.
203. See id. at 655 n.6.
204. See id. at 653-55.
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source, then trades on that information, he does not violate Rule 1Ob-
5.205 As we shall see, this is an odd result that jibes with neither the
property rights nor the securities fraud rationale for regulating insider
trading.
2. Liability for authorized trading? Suppose, for example, a takeover
bidder authorized an arbitrageur to trade in the target company's stock
on the basis of material nonpublic information about the perspective bid-
der's intentions. Rule 14e-3 proscribes warehousing of this sort, but only
insofar as the information relates to a perspective tender offer. Whether
such trading in a non-tender offer context violated Rule 10b-5 was un-
clear. The O'Hagan majority at least implicitly validated authorized trad-
ing of this sort. It approvingly quoted, for example, counsel for the
United States' comment that "[t]o satisfy the common law rule that a
trustee may not use the property that [has] been entrusted [to] him, there
would have to be consent. '20 6
3. The fiduciary relationship requirement? Does a duty to disclose to the
information's source arise before trading in all fiduciary relationships?
Consider Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(b), which states: "A
lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to
the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consulta-
tion .... -207 Does a lawyer's use of confidential client information for
insider trading purposes always operate to the client's disadvantage? If
not, and assuming the Model Rule accurately states the lawyer's fiduciary
obligation, O'Hagan did not violate Section 10(b). The O'Hagan major-
ity, however, failed to inquire into the nature of O'Hagan's duties, if any,
to Grand Met. Instead, the majority assumed that lawyers are fiduciaries,
all fiduciaries are subject to a duty to refrain from self-dealing in confi-
dential information, and, accordingly, the misappropriation theory ap-
plies to lawyers and all other fiduciaries. The majority's approach, of
course, begs the question-is O'Hagan a fiduciary?
4. Criminal or civil? In rejecting the Eighth Circuit's argument that Rule
10b-5 is primarily concerned with deception of market participants, the
majority noted that the discussion in Central Bank, upon which the
Eighth Circuit relied, dealt only with private civil litigation under Section
205. See id. at 655 ("[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation
theory: ... if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic
information, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation .... ") Id.
206. Id. at 654 (citations omitted). Footnote 7 to the majority opinion, however, sug-
gests that on these facts O'Hagan would need approval from both Dorsey & Whitney and
Grand Met. See id. at 655 n.7. An interesting question is presented by the requirement
that O'Hagan disclose his intentions to Dorsey & Whitney. Given that O'Hagan was a
partner in Dorsey & Whitney, query whether knowledge of his intentions would be im-
puted to the firm? As a practical matter, of course, O'Hagan should have informed the
lawyer with the principal responsibility for the Grand Met transaction and/or the firm's
managing partner.
207. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(b) (1997).
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10(b).20 8 The Court then went on to discuss its holding in Blue Chip
Stamps, that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities have standing
to bring private causes of action under Rule 10b-5. 20 9 The Court con-
cluded: "Criminal prosecutions do not present the dangers the Court ad-
dressed in Blue Chip Stamps, so that decision is 'inapplicable' to
indictments for violations of [Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."'210 This
passage opens the door for misappropriators to argue that O'Hagan
should be limited to criminal prosecutions, because the majority acknowl-
edged the limitations imposed by Central Bank and Blue Chip Stamps on
private party litigation. Such a limitation on private party litigation, how-
ever, seems unlikely. Although the majority declined to address the sig-
nificance of the 1988 statute and its legislative history for the validity of
the misappropriation theory, interpreting O'Hagan as validating the mis-
appropriation theory only as to criminal actions would render the private
party cause of action created by Exchange Act Section 20A nugatory.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF OHA GAN FOR THE PUZZLING PROBLEM OF
JUDICIAL INCENTIVES
One of the more puzzling features of the federal insider trading prohi-
bition is the willingness of courts to aid and abet the Commission's ef-
forts. Although the SEC's incentive to erect a broad insider trading
prohibition seems easily explainable, it is far less clear why courts would
be willing to go along. Yet they have consistently done so. The Cady,
Roberts power grab was validated by Texas Gulf Sulphur. The reversal
suffered in Chiarella was followed by Newman. The SEC's most recent
reversals in O'Hagan and Bryan were just swept aside by the Supreme
Court. At every turn, judges have aided and abetted the SEC.
What explains this judicial support for the prohibition? According to a
leading judicial behavior theory, "judges seek to impose their personal
preferences and values on society. '211 If so, the effort to federalize cor-
porate law becomes easy to understand. First, during the 1960s and '70s,
it was conventional wisdom among the legal elites, from which federal
judges tend to be selected, that state corporate law was fundamentally
flawed. 2i 2 The tenor of their decisions defining the boundaries between
state and federal law reflect this. Second, creating a federal common law
of corporations would substantially increase the amount of corporate liti-
gation within the federal court system, giving federal judges many more
opportunities to impose their personal views on business corporations.
Again, the unpopularity of insider trading and the states' hands-off ap-
proach made it a logical candidate for early federalization.
208. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664.
209. See id. (discussing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
210. Id. at 665 (citations omitted).
211. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 534 (4th ed. 1992).
212. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the AL! Corporate Govern-
ance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1045 (1993).
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I find this vision of the judicial role unappealing from a normative per-
spective and unpersuasive from an explanatory perspective. As I have
argued elsewhere, judges properly should seek to, and in fact do, enforce
not their personal preferences, but rather those policies and moral norms
that have substantial support in the community.213 Judicial cooperation
with the SEC's federalization program, however, is explainable from this
perspective as well. In light of the conventional wisdom that state corpo-
rate law was seriously flawed and that insider trading was undesirable,
judges seeking to faithfully enforce those policy and moral norms having
substantial community support would have supported federalizing insider
trading law. The lingering effects of the conventional wisdom probably
go far in explaining the lower courts' continuing willingness to support an
expansive federal insider trading prohibition.
O'Hagan is consistent with this judicial incentives theory, but it also
suggests an alternative explanation. There seems to be general agree-
ment that the Supreme Court has not done a very good job in the securi-
ties area, especially in recent years. Scholars operating in a wide
spectrum of ideological and jurisprudential paradigms have criticized the
Court's recent securities opinions.214 Supreme Court securities law deci-
sions typically lack a broad, consistent understanding of the relevant pub-
lic policy considerations. Worse yet, they frequently lack such basics as
doctrinal coherence and fidelity to prior opinions. Both points are well-
illustrated by the Court's treatment of Central Bank and Santa Fe in
O'Hagan.
Why doesn't the Supreme Court do a better job in securities cases?
Bounded rationality provides one answer. Bounded rationality posits
that there are inherent limits on the ability of individuals to gather and
process information. 215 Under conditions of uncertainty and complexity,
bounded rationality implies that decision makers will not be able to de-
vise a fully specified solution to the problem at hand or fully assess the
probable outcomes of their action.216
When deciding securities cases, the Court is operating under conditions
of complexity and uncertainty. These cases are hard, dry, and highly
technical. Supreme Court justices and their clerks arrive on the Court
with little expertise in securities law. One assumes that neither the jus-
tices nor their clerks have much interest in developing substantial institu-
213. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Social Propositions and Common Law Adjudica-
tion, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 231 (1990).
214. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2), supra note 178, at 1232 n.5, 1254
n.153.
215. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITAL-
ISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 30-32, 45-46 (1985) (defining bounded
rationality).
216. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI-
TRUST IMPLICATIONS 23 (1975) (under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, it be-
comes "very costly, perhaps impossible, to describe the complete decision tree.").
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tional expertise in this area after they arrive2 17 (former Justice Powell
being the exception that proves the rule). Accordingly, one would be
surprised if the Court's securities opinions exhibited anything remotely
resembling expert craftsmanship.
This observation is not intended to be pejorative. To the contrary, the
justices are acting rationally. Bounded rationality implies that they have
a limited ability to master legal information, including the myriad com-
plexities of doctrine and policy in the host of areas annually presented to
the Court. Specialization is a rational response to bounded rationality-
the expert in a field makes the most of his limited capacity to absorb and
master information by limiting the amount of information that must be
processed by limiting the breadth of the field in which he develops exper-
tise. Supreme Court justices will therefore need to specialize, just as ex-
perts in other fields. Specializing in securities law would not be rational.
The psychic rewards of being a justice-present day celebrity and histori-
cal fame-are associated with decisions on the great constitutional issues
of the day, not the minutiae of securities regulation.
Under such conditions, one would expect the justices to take securities
cases rarely, typically only when there is a serious circuit split, which is in
fact what we observe.218 When faced with the necessity of deciding secur-
ities law issues, the justices and their clerks doubtless recognize that they
lack the expertise necessary to decide such questions with confidence. As
specialists in a different field, they may be inclined to defer to specialists
in the securities law field.219 Deference to specialists is a rational re-
sponse to bounded rationality. Like all decision makers, Supreme Court
justices presumably care about their reputation for competence.220 Be-
cause their decisions are publicly observable, they have a strong incentive
to defer to expert opinion. Because even a good decision maker is sub-
ject to the proverbial "act of God," the market for reputation evaluates
decision makers by looking at both the outcome and the action before
forming a judgment. If a bad outcome occurs, but the action was consis-
tent with approved expert opinion, the hit to the decision maker's reputa-
tion is reduced. In effect, by deferring to specialists, a decision maker
operating under conditions of bounded rationality is buying insurance
against a bad outcome.
This model is quite consistent with what happened in O'Hagan. The
misappropriation theory was almost two decades old before the Court
217. For an argument that appellate judges routinely duck hard securities law issues,
see Mitu Gulati and Catherine McCauliff, On Not Making Law (Sept. 30, 1998) (draft
materials on file with author).
218. See Langevoort, supra note 35, at 865 ("[T]he Supreme Court does extremely little
of the adjudicatory work in securities law .... ).
219. Cf. William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor with No Clothes: The Supreme Court's
Tax Rules for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1685, 1727 (1994) (sug-
gesting that in tax cases the Supreme Court may defer, perhaps even unconsciously, to
specialists at the IRS and Treasury).
220. See Gulati and McCauliff, supra note 216 (positing that reputation, prestige, and
status are important motivating factors for judges).
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finally resolved its validity. It did so only after a major circuit split had
emerged. In resolving the case, the majority did essentially what the gov-
ernment told it to do-the misappropriation section of Justice Ginsburg's
opinion repeatedly quoted from or cited to the government's brief and
oral argument, almost always approvingly. She framed the case as one
involving a "theory of liability for which the Government seeks recogni-
tion,"'221 and adopted the central element of the government's theory.222
In other words, she quite blatantly deferred to expert opinion.
More work is necessary to develop a theory of Supreme Court decision
making based on specialization and deference to specialists as a response
to bounded rationality. One speculates, for example, that justices are
more likely to defer to internal rather than external experts. If so, the
widely shared assumption that Justice Powell received substantial defer-
ence from his colleagues in this area has a rational economic explanation.
A future project will attempt to develop the theory in more detail and
give it the necessary empirical grounding. At present, the intent is only to
be suggestive. Even in its present raw form, however, the theory has
identifiable implications for how lower courts should interpret O'Hagan
and other Supreme Court securities opinions.
Consider, for example, the "possession" versus "use" debate. The SEC
has long argued that trading while in knowing possession of material non-
public information satisfies Rule 10b-5's scienter requirement. In United
States v. Teicher,223 the Second Circuit agreed, albeit in a passage that
appears to be dictum. An attorney tipped stock market speculators about
transactions involving clients of his firm. On appeal, the defendants ob-
jected to a jury instruction, pursuant to which they could be found guilty
of securities fraud, based upon the mere possession of fraudulently ob-
tained material nonpublic information without regard to whether that in-
formation was the actual cause of their transactions. The Second Circuit
indicated that any error in the instruction was harmless, but went on to
opine in favor of a knowing possession test.
In SEC v. Adler,224 the Eleventh Circuit rejected Teicher in favor of a
use standard.225 Under Adler.
when an insider trades while in possession of material nonpublic in-
formation, a strong inference arises that such information was used
by the insider in trading. The insider can attempt to rebut the infer-
ence by adducing evidence that there was no causal connection be-
tween the information and the trade-i.e., that the information was
221. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
222. See id. at 659.
223. 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
224. 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
225. See id. The Ninth Circuit recently agreed with Adler that Rule lOb-5 requires
proof of use, not mere possession. The Ninth Circuit further held that in criminal cases no
presumption of use should be drawn from the fact of possession-the government must
affirmatively prove use of nonpublic information. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d




Although defendant Pegram apparently possessed material nonpublic
information when he traded, he introduced strong evidence that he had
planned to sell company stock, and that his plan predated his acquisition
of the information in question. If proven at trial, evidence of such a plan
would rebut the inference of use and justify an acquittal on grounds that
he lacked the requisite scienter. Similarly, the court opined, evidence
that the allegedly illegal trades were consistent with trading would like-
wise rebut the inference of use.227
The choice between Adler and Teicher is difficult. On the one hand, in
adopting the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Congress imposed
treble money civil fines on those who illegally, traded "while in posses-
sion" of material nonpublic information. 228 In addition, a use standard
significantly complicates the government's burden in insider trading
cases. Motivation is always harder to establish than possession, although
the inference of use permitted by Adler substantially alleviates this con-
cern. On the other hand, a mere possession test is inconsistent with Rule
10b-5's scienter requirement, which requires fraudulent intent (or at least
recklessness). A number of decisions have acknowledged that a pre-ex-
isting plan and/or prior trading pattern can be introduced as an affirma-
tive defense in insider trading cases, as such evidence tends to disprove
that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter.229
The most instructive aspect of Adler and Teicher, for our purposes, is
their hermeneutical similarity. Both approach the relevant Supreme
Court decisions as an innerrantist approaches Holy Writ.230 Both further
assume that exegesis at a minute level of Supreme Court opinions in this
area is both plausible and practical. In Teicher, for example, the Second
Circuit interpreted Chiarella as comporting with "the oft-quoted maxim
that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to hold material nonpublic infor-
mation in confidence must either 'disclose or abstain' with regard to trad-
ing." 2 1 In Adler, the Eleventh Circuit carefully parsed language from all
three leading Supreme Court opinions, which the court concluded sup-
ported the use test. 3 2 The court at times seems to be reading Supreme
Court decisions as though (1) those decisions were statutes to be inter-
226. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337.
227. See id. at 1341.
228. For a discussion of the 1984 Act's implications for the possession versus use de-
bate, see Bainbridge, A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, supra note
159, at 493-97.
229. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1335-36 (discussing cases).
230. Inerrancy is a theological position most closely associated with evangelical Protes-
tants, who assert that "the Bible in its original autographs and correctly interpreted is en-
tirely true and never false in all it affirms ...." EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY
142 (Walter A. Ewell ed. 1984).
231. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120. The court also favored the possession standard because
"[it recognizes that one who trades while knowingly possessing material inside informa-
tion has an informational advantage over other traders." Id. This aspect of the Teicher
court's analysis is inconsistent with Chiarella's rejection of the equal access test.
232. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1333-34, 1338.
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preted from a strict textualist perspective, and (2) one could ascribe in-
tentionality to the justices' utterances. A theory of Supreme Court
decision-making that was founded on bounded rationality, by contrast,
argues for declining to ascribe intentionality to the Court. Supreme
Court decisions in this area should be interpreted narrowly, as reaching
only the specific issues before the Court, while dictum should be largely
ignored. In other words, the choice between Adler and Teicher should be
made almost without reference to the trilogy of Supreme Court insider
trading opinions. None of them squarely addresses the issue, and the dic-
tum in each that seems relevant to other issues, such as the possession
versus use debate, should get little deference.
C. STATUS OF CENTRAL BANK AND SANTA FE
Another consequence of the infrequency with which the Supreme
Court decides securities law issues is that the ballgame typically is not the
specific pronouncement the Supreme Court makes a given case, but how
that pronouncement is interpreted, extended, and/or restricted by the
lower courts. 233 Lower court judges frequently engage in creative rein-
terpretation of Supreme Court opinions in this area, as the evolution of
the misappropriation theory itself illustrates.234 Knowing that the
Supreme Court is unlikely to re-visit a particular issue anytime in the
near future, if ever, and that the Court's lack of institutional expertise
means that it rarely follows its own precedents with fidelity, lower courts
feel free to impose their own policy preferences within the often ambigu-
ous guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court. Where the Supreme
Court attempts significant shifts in the status quo and/or the direction in
which the law is moving, this process of creative reinterpretation fre-
quently leads to a gradual rejection of the new direction and a return to
the status quo.235 Hence, for example, when Chiarella rejected the equal
access standard, lower courts developed the misappropriation theory as a
way of restoring much of the prohibition's pre-Chiarella breadth.
This phenomenon readily can be reconciled with path dependence. In
terms of the road metaphor, the Supreme Court is not unlike a state or
federal highway agency, which knows little about the road's history or the
local interests its present shape serves. As a result, one might expect oc-
casional pronouncements that the road must be straightened and gener-
ally brought up to agency standards. When local authorities implement
these directives, however, their relatively greater expertise and familiarity
with relevant local interests may help ensure that the road's present
shape remains largely unchanged.
Central Bank and Santa Fe both marked dramatic shifts in the law as it
had been developed in lower courts.236 As a result, both decisions met
233. See Langevoort, supra note 35, at 865-67.
234. See id. at 866-677.
235. See id. at 867-68.
236. See id. at 886-87.
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with resistance from lower courts. As we have seen, the lower courts that
upheld the misappropriation theory ignored Central Bank's negative im-
plications for the theory. Santa Fe has met with even greater resistance
from lower courts. Some courts have permitted 10b-5 causes of action to
lie where the nondisclosure led plaintiffs to forego pursuing an available
state law remedy.237 This approach has been subjected to well-justified
criticism23 8 because it allows litigants to end-run Santa Fe by pointing to a
nondisclosure or misrepresentation cause of action, even though the bulk
of their case goes to breach of fiduciary duty. While it might be argued
that liability is being imposed because of the nondisclosure of the breach,
rather than because of the breach itself, failure to disclose a breach of
duty is not actionable under Rule 10b-5.239 In any case, the lower court
approach imposes liability for failing to disclose information not relevant
to making investment decisions, which is the concern of the securities
laws, but to making state law litigation decisions, a matter wholly outside
the scope of securities law. Finally, the lower court's chosen escape de-
vice ignores the thrust of Santa Fe by not deferring to the strong policy
reasons laid out by the Supreme Court for refraining from intruding fed-
eral law into a sphere traditionally left for state law.
The O'Hagan majority gives considerable aid and comfort to those who
have sought to limit Central Bank and Santa Fe. The majority essentially
orphaned the former. Justice Ginsburg largely ignored the statutory text,
except for glib assertions made with respect to the meaning of the phrases
"deception" and "in connection with." She likewise ignored the cogent
arguments advanced by both the Eighth and Fourth Circuits with respect
to the implications of Central Bank for the misappropriation theory.240
Most importantly, she ignored the interpretive methodology expounded
in Central Bank.241 One is therefore left to wonder whether the strict
textualist approach taken by Central Bank was an aberrational departure
from the more policy-sensitive approach exemplified by previous
Supreme Court securities law decisions.242
237. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir.
1980); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977).
238. See, e.g., Healey, 616 F.2d at 651-61 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
239. See Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400,401 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Sears, Roebuck
& Co. Securities Litig., 792 F. Supp. 977, 981 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Merritt v. Colonial Foods,
Inc., 499 F. Supp. 910, 913-14 (D. Del. 1980).
240. To the extent the majority discussed Central Bank's implications for the problem
at hand, it focused on dismissing the Eighth Circuit's argument that Central Bank limited
Rule 10b-5's regulatory purview to purchasers and sellers. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664.
241. Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's Rule 10b-5 holding, relying on the
"unelaborated statutory language." Id. at 679.
242. The majority's interpretation of the phrase "in connection with," as used in Section
10(b), is especially troubling. Fraudulent conduct having only a slight connection with a
securities transaction is now within the scope of Rule 10b-5. There has long been a risk
that Rule 10b-5 will become a universal solvent, encompassing not only virtually the entire
universe of securities fraud, but also much of state corporate law. The minimal contacts
O'Hagan requires between the fraudulent act and a securities transaction substantially ex-
acerbate that risk. The uncertainty created as to Rule 10b-5's parameters fairly raises
vagueness and related due process issues, despite the majority's rather glib dismissal of
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As to Santa Fe, Justice Ginsburg correctly described that case as "un-
derscoring that section 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary
duty ban; rather it trains on conduct involving manipulation or decep-
tion." 243 Instead of acknowledging that insider trading is mainly a fiduci-
ary duty issue, however, she treated it solely as a disclosure issue. Thus,
failure to disclose that one is about to inside trade is the problem, not the
trade itself: "A fiduciary who '[pretends] loyalty to the principal while
secretly converting the principal's information for personal gain,' 'dupes'
or defrauds the principal. '2 44 As Justice Ginsburg acknowledged, this ap-
proach means that full disclosure must preclude liability.245
Granted, insider trading involves deception in the sense that the de-
fendant, by definition, failed to disclose nonpublic information before
trading. As we have seen, however, persons subject to the disclose or
abstain theory are also often subject to a state law-based fiduciary duty of
confidentiality, which precludes them from disclosing the information.
As to them, the insider trading prohibition becomes a rule to abstain
from trading, rather than a rule requiring disclosure or abstention. 246
Moreover, if such a duty did not exist, identifying the parties to whom the
requisite disclosure must be made presents an insurmountable obstacle in
cases involving trading on an impersonal stock exchange. As such,
O'Hagan collapses the prohibition into a rule that all fiduciaries must
abstain from trading on material nonpublic information. In other words,
it really is the failure to abstain from trading, rather than the nondisclo-
sure, which is the basis for imposing liability. The nondisclosure thus re-
mains wholly incidental to the violation, which remains a breach of
fiduciary duty. Therefore, Santa Fe remains a serious obstacle for the
misappropriation theory.
Justice Ginsburg may or may not have recognized this problem. In
either case, her opinion provides a solution, but only at the expense of
gutting Santa Fe of its principal meaning. Her majority opinion dismissed
Santa Fe as a mere disclosure case: "[I]n Santa Fe Industries, all pertinent
facts were disclosed by the persons charged with violating Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5; therefore, there was no deception through nondisclosure
such concerns. Compare O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666 (rejecting O'Hagan's vagueness argu-
ments) with Painter et al., supra note 91, at 196-200 (arguing that the misappropriation
theory is impermissibly vague).
243. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
244. Id. at 653-54 (citations omitted).
245. See id. at 654.
246. Justice Ginsburg's approach also can be criticized as reviving the circularity prob-
lem discussed above. Recall that failure to disclose material nonpublic information before
trading does not always violate Rule lOb-5. In omission cases, which include all insider
trading on impersonal stock exchanges, liability can be imposed only if the defendant had a
duty to disclose before trading. If Rule 1Ob-5 itself creates the requisite duty, however, this
requirement is effectively negated. As such, the requisite duty should come from outside
the securities laws. Indeed, given Santa Fe, it must come from outside federal law. Yet,
O'Hagan plausibly can be read as creating a federal disclosure obligation arising out of
Rule 10b-5.
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to which liability under those provisions could attach." 247 In effect, she
endorsed the device by which lower courts have sought to evade Santa Fe.
In order to do so, however, she side-lined (by ignoring) the serious feder-
alism concerns that drove Santa Fe.
The conceptual conflict between the Supreme Court's current insider
trading jurisprudence and its more general Rule 10b-5 precedents re-
mains unresolved. Doctrinal purists will find the tensions between the
two lines of precedent troubling. If my bounded rationality hypothesis
has validity, however, such disparities are not surprising. Indeed, the hy-
pothesis explains the otherwise rather puzzling persistence of the doctri-
nal tension between the Supreme Court's insider trading cases and the
Court's general 10b-5 jurisprudence. The law may be a seamless web, but
as non-specialists dealing with a highly technical field, the justices are un-
able to see the entire web or predict how tugging on one strand will affect
the whole. Again, the problem may be that we err by ascribing intention-
ality to any Supreme Court precedent in this area. It may be that fidelity
to precedent is simply not possible under the conditions we have
specified.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the Supreme Court should con-
sciously ask whether deference to specialists is appropriate in a particular
instance. Although deference to experts is a rational response by deci-
sion makers in the justices' position, such deference may lead them astray
when the expert also is a party to an adversarial position.248 The govern-
247. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (citations omitted).
248. One example of the ways the court can be led astray is offered by the govern-
ment's contention that agency law supported its position. The government's brief cited
sections 388, 390, and 395 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency for the proposition that
disclosure to the principal is required before the agent may use for personal profit confi-
dential information entrusted to him by the principal. See Weiss, supra note 234, at 426-27
(quoting from and discussing the government's position). In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg
cited two of those sections for that very proposition. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654-55. To
be sure, according to the Restatement of Agency, the principal-agent relationship is a fidu-
ciary one with respect to matters within the scope of the agency relationship. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1957). More to the point, Section 388 of the
Agency Restatement imposes a duty on agents to account for profits made in connection
with transactions conducted on the principal's behalf. See id. § 388. The comments to that
section further expand this duty's scope, requiring the agent to account for any profits
made by the use of confidential information even if the principal is not harmed by the
agent's use of the information. See id. § 388 cmt. c. One can plausibly argue, however, that
the apparent bar on insider trading created by agency law is not as strict as it first appears.
The broad prohibition of self-dealing in confidential information appears solely in the com-
ments to Sections 388 and 395. In contrast, the black letter text of Section 388 speaks only
of profits made "in connection with transactions conducted by [the agent] on behalf of the
principal .. " Id. § 388. One must stretch the phrases "in connection with" and "on
behalf of" pretty far in order to reach insider trading profits. Similarly, Section 395, which
speaks directly to the issue of self-dealing in confidential information, only prohibits the
use of confidential information for personal gain "in competition with or to the injury of
the principal." Id. § 395.. Unless one is confident that insider trading by an agent always
injures the principal, agency law thus fails to impose an across-the-board ban on the prac-
tice. This argument is supported by Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978)
(applying Indiana law) (holding that corporate officers and directors could not be held
liable for insider trading as a matter of state corporate law without a showing that the
corporation was injured by their conduct). Accord Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla.
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ment's interest in O'Hagan was to win, not to clarify the law. As we have
seen, the SEC has strong incentives to obtain an expansive insider trading
prohibition. Besides that powerful institutional interest, it is important to
recall that the government is represented by individual lawyers, for whom
winning is itself important.2 49 Unless these lawyers were willing to explic-
itly make the sort of path dependence-based arguments advanced herein,
Central Bank and Santa Fe loomed as serious obstacles to their victory.
Therefore, one would not expect them to devote much effort to helping
the Court work through the implications of those cases for the misappro-
priation theory.
D. O'HAGAN AND THE PROPERTY RIGHTS RATIONALE
In developing my argument, I have not tried to hide the ball-it should
be clear by now that I believe the Supreme Court should have used Judge
Winter's opinion in Chestman as a model for deciding O'Hagan. As we
have seen, Judge Winter acknowledged that the misappropriation theory
lacked any real connection to, or justification under, traditional securities
fraud concepts. 250 Instead, as he also recognized, protection of the source
of the information's property rights therein is the strongest justification
for a continued prohibition of insider trading.251 Using language that
smacked of path dependence, Judge Winter opined that technical doctri-
nal problems posed by the misappropriation theory should be overlooked
to preserve the policy benefits the theory provided.25 2
The Supreme Court should likewise have treated the prohibition's loca-
tion in the federal securities laws as a historical accident, which has some
continuing justification in the SEC's comparative advantage in detecting
and prosecuting insider trading on stock markets. The Court should have
then focused on the problem as one of implicating fiduciary duties with
respect to property rights in information, rather than one of deceit or
manipulation. The Court should have forthrightly acknowledged that this
interpretation of the federal insider trading prohibition ran afoul of Cen-
tral Bank and Santa Fe. Unfortunately, as the Eighth and Fourth Circuit
opinions persuasively demonstrated, there does not appear to be any way
of preserving the misappropriation theory-and perhaps the prohibition
itself-without running afoul of those precedents. As the road parable
makes plain, however, there are costs to repairing a path dependent prob-
lem. Those costs were (1) doctrinal tensions between two closely related
lines of precedent, and (2) the institutional competence of the Supreme
Court in making what amounts to federal common law. The Court could
1975). Regarding Section 390, it is essentially inapplicable to the problem at hand. Section
390 deals with situations in which the agent acts on his own account in transactions with the
principal.
249. Klein, supra note 219, at 1725 n.147 (making the same point with respect to the
role of government lawyers in tax cases).
250. See supra text accompanying note 149.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 75-75.
252. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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have justified incurring those costs by accepting the full implications of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation that Rule 10b-5 is "a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. ''253 In other
words, the Court could have treated the insider trading prohibition as a
special case of judge-made federal common law, whose continued exist-
ence is justified by prudential considerations rather than the precise stat-
utory language of Section 10(b) or doctrinaire federalism.
The majority chose not to do so. Instead, it voluntarily strapped itself
into the securities fraud straight-jacket. In doing so, its contribution to
resolving the doctrinal tension between the insider trading prohibition
and its Central Bank and Santa Fe precedents consisted solely of provid-
ing ammunition for those who wish to gut those opinions. Moreover, by
preserving the judge-made common law of misappropriation, the Court
failed to address the institutional competence questions that continue to
plague the prohibition. The majority's approach, in other words, proved
no less costly than the approach I have advocated.
The only remaining question is whether the majority did as much dam-
age to the policy basis of the prohibition as it did to the doctrine. As it
turns out, the majority opinion is something of a mixed bag. Both propo-
nents and opponents of the property rights rationale will be able to quote
passages indicating support for their position, but neither should take
much comfort from O'Hagan. The basic problem is that the majority ap-
pears to have no clearer understanding of the policy issues at stake than it
did of the doctrinal ones.
The majority opinion began promisingly enough with an acknowledge-
ment that confidential information belonging to corporations "qualifies
as property. ' 254 The Court's authorized trading dictum is also consistent
with the property rights rationale, while being demonstrably inconsistent
with traditional securities law-based policy justifications for the insider
trading prohibition. 255 There is a general presumption that property
rights ought to be alienable. Accordingly, if we are concerned with pro-
tecting the source of the information's property rights, we generally ought
to permit the source to authorize others to trade on that information.256
In contrast, legalizing authorized trading makes little sense if the policy
goal is the traditional securities fraud concern of protecting investors and
253. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
254. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
255. Indeed, one might almost argue that the majority gave too much protection to
property rights in information. The logic of the O'Hagan majority suggests that any undis-
closed use of a principal's property by an agent constitutes the requisite deception. Sup-
pose, for example, O'Hagan had ordered the shares in question by a long distance
telephone call to his broker and billed the call to the firm without its knowledge or con-
sent. (The example is taken from Painter et aL., supra note 91, at 178). In such a case, there
has been a deception that was consummated when the thief bought securities. As such, the
thief-by Justice Ginsburg's logic-has used a deceptive device in connection with the
purchase of a security and has violated Rule 10b-5, which seems patently absurd.
256. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading under the Restatement of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 37-39 (1993) (noting that mandatory rules may be appro-
priate in some cases).
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maintaining their confidence in the integrity of the markets. Would an
investor who traded with O'Hagan feel any better about doing so if she
knew that Dorsey and Whitney had authorized O'Hagan's trades?
The authorized trading dictum has significant, but as yet little-noticed,
implications.25 7 Query, for example, whether it applies to all insider trad-
ing cases or just to misappropriation cases. Suppose that in a classic dis-
close or abstain case, such as Texas Gulf Sulphur, the issuer's board of
directors adopted a policy that allowed insider trading by managers. If
they did so, the corporation has consented to any such inside trading,
which under Justice Ginsburg's analysis appears to vitiate any deception.
The corporate policy itself presumably would have to be disclosed, just as
broad disclosure respecting executive compensation is already required,
but the implication is that authorized trading should not result in 10b-5
liability under either theory.258
The authorized trading dictum might have even broader implications if
its logic is generally extended to Rule 10b-5. Consider, for example, the
dictum's implications for a case like Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 2 9
which involved a non-insider trading Rule 10b-5 claim which arose out of
a merger involving a close corporation. Jordan was a securities analyst
who worked for Duff & Phelps, a credit and securities rating firm. Jordan
purchased shares in Duff & Phelps pursuant to a shareholders agreement
that included, inter alia, a mandatory buy-back provision triggered by ter-
mination of employment, under which a terminated employee would re-
ceive book value for his shares. Unbeknownst to Jordan, Duff & Phelps
was negotiating a merger with Security Pacific. If effected, shareholders
would receive a price considerably in excess of book value. Jordan quit,
tendered his stock to the company, received the book value thereof, and
later learned that Duff & Phelps was going to be acquired in a leveraged
buy-out. Jordan sued under Rule 10b-5, alleging that the failure to dis-
close the merger negotiations was an omission of a material fact that the
company had a duty to disclose.
The most interesting aspect of the resulting opinion, for our purposes,
is the claim made by Judge Posner's dissent: "The terms of the stock-
holder agreement show that there was no duty of disclosure, and since
there was no duty there was no violation of Rule 1Ob-5.''26° In effect,
Judge Posner asserted that the scope of the duty to disclose may be de-
fined by contract. Because the shareholder agreement did not require
disclosure, there was no duty to disclose.2 61 It is but a short step from
257. I am indebted to my colleague, Mitu Gulati, for suggesting this line of inquiry.
258. Notice that in authorized trading cases this would fall within the misappropriation
theory rather than the disclose or abstain rule (i.e., an authorization by the source of mar-
ket information), so neither the source of the information nor the inside trader would have
any obligation to disclose to the market or to those with whom the trader transacts. This
observation further illustrates the rather tenuous connection between insider trading and
securities fraud.
259. 815 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1987).
260. Id. at 444 (Posner, J., dissenting).
261. See id. at 446-47.
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that holding to the converse proposition that a party to whom a duty to
disclose is owed may contractually waive that entitlement. The majority
(per Judge Easterbrook) agreed with the principle, but thought it inappli-
cable on the facts:
It is a violation of duty to steal from the corporate treasury; it is not a
violation to write oneself a check that the board has approved as a
bonus. We may assume that duties concerning the timing of disclo-
sure by an otherwise-silent firm also may be the subject of contract.
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... forbids
waivers of the provisions of the Act, and here the critical provision is
[Section] 10 (b) ... and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 .... But a provision
must be applicable to be "waived", and the existence of a require-
ment to speak is a condition of the application of [Section] 10(b) to a
person's silence during a securities trade. The obligation to break
silence is itself based on state law.., and so may be redefined to the
extent state law permits. But we need not decide how far contracts
can redefine obligations to disclose. Jordan was an employee at will;
he signed no contract. 262
Jordan stands in sharp contrast with the widely-shared assumption that
federal securities laws are mandatory, rather than enabling, and are thus
not subject to contractual opting out.263 The authorized trading dictum in
O'Hagan, however, supports the Easterbrook/Posner position. If mere
disclosure of trading intentions suffices to foreclose Rule 10b-5 liability,
as Ginsburg states,264 then consent to trading must likewise foreclose
such liability. If consent to trading on a case-by-case basis forecloses lia-
bility, blanket (albeit informed) ex ante consent should do likewise. In
neither case has the source of the information been deceived. If ex ante
consent would foreclose insider trading liability, the logical implication is
that a consensual waiver of a disclosure obligation should also foreclose
Rule 10b-5 liability.
I do not propose to delve more deeply into the thorny doctrinal and
policy issues raised by this reading of O'Hagan. Instead, for my purposes,
it suffices to predict that this reading of the majority opinion will not
command widespread acceptance. The misappropriation theory an-
nounced in O'Hagan is premised on fraud on the source of the informa-
tion. In Carpenter, for example, liability would be premised on fraud
perpetrated on the Wall Street Journal265 Acting through appropriate de-
cision making processes, the Journal could authorize inside trading by its
agents. By contrast, however, Chiarella focused the classic disclose or ab-
stain rule on fraud perpetrated on the specific investors with whom the
insiders trade.266 Authorization of inside trading by the issuer's board of
directors, or even by a majority of the shareholders, does not constitute
262. Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
263. See supra text accompanying note 12.
264. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
265. Cf id. at 654-55 (noting parallels between Carpenter and misappropriation under
Rule 10b-5).
266. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
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consent by the specific investors with whom the insider trades. Nothing
in O'Hagan explicitly suggests an intent to undermine the Chiarella inter-
pretation of the traditional disclose or abstain rule. To the contrary, Jus-
tice Ginsburg expressly states that the two theories are
"complementary. 2 67 Because the disclose or abstain rule thus remains
conceptually distinct from the misappropriation theory, the authorized
trading dictum can be plausibly limited to the latter context.
Institutional analysis of the incentives of the relevant players predicts
that the authorized trading dictum decision-makers will seize upon this
(or a similar) argument to justify narrowly construing the authorized
trading dictum. As we have seen, the SEC has a strong institutional in-
centive to press for an expansive interpretation of the federal insider
trading prohibition. Market professionals and other important interest
groups also favor an expansive reading of the prohibition. Lower courts
have consistently favored an expansive variant of the prohibition. The
status quo bias thus buttresses strong interest group and bureaucratic in-
centives in favor of an expansive reading. As such, we can expect the
SEC to press, and lower courts to accept, a reading of O'Hagan that pros-
cribes authorized trading in cases covered by the traditional disclose or
abstain rule.
Irrespective of whether the foregoing prediction is ratified, the mere
fact that the issue arose in the first instance is instructive. Did Justice
Ginsburg intend to validate the property rights approach to insider trad-
ing? Did Justice Ginsburg intend to validate contractual waivers of Rule
10b-5 duties? I doubt it. The bounded rationality hypothesis advanced
above suggests that she probably failed to realize that her dictum had
implications reaching beyond the misappropriation context.
Declining to ascribe intentionality to the portions of the majority opin-
ion pointing toward a property rights basis for the prohibition is further
justified by the fact that the opinion quickly shifted gears towards treating
the problem as one sounding in traditional securities fraud: "Deception
through nondisclosure is central to the theory of liability for which the
Government seeks recognition," and which the majority accepted.268 In-
deed, the incoherence of the majority opinion on policy issues is well-
illustrated by its arguable revival of the long-discredited equal access the-
ory of liability.2 69 For example, in justifying her claim that the misappro-
priation theory was consistent with Section 10(b), Justice Ginsburg
opined that the theory advances "an animating purpose of the Exchange
Act: to insure [sic] honest securities markets and thereby promote inves-
tor confidence. 2 70 She went on to claim that "investors likely would
hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on mis-
267. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
268. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
269. For an argument that O'Hagan is premised on equal access-related concerns, See
Weiss, surpa note 234 at 395.
270. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
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appropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law," because those
who trade with misappropriators suffer from an informational disadvan-
tage "that cannot be overcome with research or skill."271 The parallels to
Texas Gulf Sulphur are obvious. If we want to protect investors from
informational disadvantages that cannot be overcome by research or skill,
moreover, the equal access test is far better suited to doing so than the
ChiarellalDirks framework.
Yet, predictably, the majority showed no greater fidelity to equality of
access to information than it did to protection of property rights. In
O'Hagan, the majority made clear that disclosure to the source of the
information is all that is required under Rule 10b-5. If a misappropriator
brazenly discloses his trading plans to the source, and then trades (either
with the source's approval or over its objection), Rule 10b-5 is not
violated.272
The brazen misappropriator dictum is inconsistent with both an inves-
tor protection rationale for the prohibition and the property rights justifi-
cation. As to the former, investors who trade with a brazen
misappropriator presumably will not feel any greater confidence in the
integrity of the securities market if they later find out that the misap-
propriator had disclosed his intentions to the source of the information.
As to the latter, requiring the prospective misappropriator to disclose his
intentions before trading provides only weak protection of the source of
the information's property rights therein. To be sure, in cases in which
the disclosure obligation is satisfied, the difficult task of detecting im-
proper trading is eliminated. Moreover, as the majority pointed out, the
source may have state law claims against the misappropriator.273 In some
jurisdictions, however, it is far from clear whether inside trading by a fi-
duciary violates state law.274 Even where state law proscribes such trad-
ing, the Supreme Court's approach means that in brazen misappropriator
cases we lose the comparative advantage the SEC has in litigating insider
trading cases and the benefit of the well-developed and relatively liberal
remedy under Rule 10b-5.
In sum, the internal inconsistencies that plague the majority opinion
preclude any reading of O'Hagan that ascribes rational intentionality
thereto. The opinion fails to cohere as to either policy or doctrine. It
forecloses neither the equal access nor the property rights policy rationale
for the Rule, while also failing to privilege either rationale. As I have
demonstrated, this failure is a direct consequence of the Court's failure to
appreciate the power of the path dependence metaphor Judge Winter im-
plicitly invoked in Chestman. Just as a child might break his toy by at-
271. Id. at 658-59.
272. See id. at 655 ("full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation the-
ory ... if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on nonpublic informa-
tion, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no [Section] 10(b) violation").
273. See id.
274. See Bainbridge, State Law, supra note 24, at 1216-27 (discussing state law on in-
sider trading by corporate counsel, officers, and directors).
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tempting to force a square peg into a round hole, the Supreme Court
made a force of insider trading law (and Rule lOb-5 generally) by at-
tempting to force insider trading into securities fraud-a paradigm that
does not fit.
V. CONCLUSION
O'Hagan represents not just a missed opportunity, but also a serious
misstep by the Supreme Court. Neither the majority nor the principal
dissent demonstrated any understanding of or concern for the substantial
doctrinal and policy issues presented by the case. Neither opinion shed
much light on those issues, while the majority in most respects left the
field in worse condition than it found it. Santa Fe was gutted, and Central
Bank was ignored, but both remain conceptual hurdles for the federal
insider trading prohibition. On the policy front, the majority opinion un-
dermined both the property rights and the equal access rationales for reg-
ulating insider trading.
What makes O'Hagan so frustrating is that a powerful model for writ-
ing a sensible opinion upholding the misappropriation theory lay readily
in hand-Judge Winter's Chestman opinion. In this article, I have argued
that the colloquial understanding of path dependence offers a heuristi-
cally powerful metaphor by which one can grapple with the insider trad-
ing problem. The road parable focuses our attention on the proper
issues-how did we get to this point, what paths are available for the
future, which of those paths are feasible, and what costs would be en-
tailed in choosing one of the various feasible alternatives over the others.
This Article posits the following answers to those questions.
" Cady, Roberts, and Texas Gulf Sulphur started the insider trading
prohibition down a securities fraud-based evolutionary path. That
choice was neither necessary or inevitable, but rather an artifact of
the SEC's desire to seize regulatory jurisdiction in order to ad-
vance the agency's agenda and interests.
" The securities fraud path proved a regrettable choice. Insider
trading is far more closely akin to the class of problems dealt with
by state corporate law than that dealt with by federal securities
law. As a doctrinal matter, insider trading fits awkwardly, at best,
within a fraud model. As a policy matter, regulating insider trad-
ing makes sense only as a means of protecting property rights in
information, a policy wholly outside the securities laws' purview.
" Yet, as Judge Winter asserted in Chestman, we have gone too far
down the federal path to turn back. Settled expectations and in-
terests of both the regulators and the regulated, the status quo
bias, and comparative advantages all argue for preserving the pro-
hibition as a species of federal common law.
To be sure, my approach implicates all sorts of issues of institutional com-
petence, statutory interpretation, federalism, and the like, but there is no
getting around the fact that the Supreme Court has been creating a fed-
eral common law of insider trading-indeed, of securities fraud gener-
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ally-for a very long time. Again, I invoke then-Justice Rehnquist's
candid concession that Rule 10b-5 is "a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn." 275 The Court should again ex-
plicitly acknowledge that it is making common law. The rules it an-
nounces should be based on protection of property rights, not on inapt
securities fraud concepts. Finally, the federalism concerns raised by the
conflict between the prohibition and Santa Fe can be finessed by incorpo-
rating state law as the rule of decision to the fullest extent possible. This
solution is pragmatic and prudential, but since when are they vices rather
than virtues?
275. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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